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Policy Research Working Paper 5882
The household enterprise sector has a significant role 
in the Tanzanian economy. It employs a larger share 
of the urban labor force than wage employment, and 
is increasingly seen as an alternative to agriculture 
as a source of additional income for rural and urban 
households. The sector is uniquely placed within the 
informal sector, where it represents both conditions of 
informal employment and informal enterprise. 
   This paper presents a case study on Tanzania using a 
mixed approach by combining both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis to examine the important role of 
household enterprises in the labor force of Tanzania, and 
to identify key factors that influence their productivity. 
Household enterprise owners are similar to typical labor 
force participants although primary education appears to 
be the minimum qualification for household enterprise 
operators to be successful. Access to location matters 
- good, secure location in a marketplace or industrial 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at jkweka@worldbank.org.  
cluster raises earnings—and access to transport and 
electricity is found to have a significant effect on earnings 
as well. In large urban areas, the biggest constraint faced 
by household enterprises is the lack of access to secure 
workspace to run the small business. Although lack of 
credit is a problem across all enterprises in Tanzania, 
household enterprises are more vulnerable because they 
are largely left out of the financial sector either as savers 
or borrowers. 
   Although HEs are part of the livelihood strategies of 
over half of households in Tanzania, they are ignored 
in the current development policy frameworks, which 
emphasize formalization, not productivity. Tanzania has 
a large number of programs and projects for informal 
enterprises, but there is no set of policies and program 
interventions targeted at the household enterprise sector. 
This gap exacerbates the vulnerability of household 
enterprises, and reduces their productivity.  
 


























JEL Classification:  O17, J23, D13, O55 
Key Words:     employment, micro enterprises, household enterprises, job creation, youth, poverty 
reduction, returns to education and training, self-employment, female employment, informal economy, 
Tanzania,  
 
                                                           
1 We are grateful to Alexandru Cojocaru, Rafael Novella, and Elizabeth Mehta for data analysis, and to Caterina 
Laderchi for initiating the project. Useful inputs were received from Flora Kessy, Deogratias Mushi, and Godwil 
Wanga in Tanzania. William Steel, Waly Wane, Yutaka Yoshino, and Paolo Zacchia provided helpful comments 
and support. We also acknowledge valuable comments received from a roundtable discussion with high-level 
government officials in August, 2010; and from a stakeholders‟ workshop in February, 2011. The paper also 
benefited from comments by participants in the workshop on Employment and Poverty, organized by ILO in 
collaboration with REPOA and the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOLE). Further comments were received 
from Prof. Benno Ndulu (Governor of the Bank of Tanzania). The financial support by the Belgian Partnership for 
Poverty Reduction, the donors of the TFESSD and the SPMDTF, and the World Bank is highly appreciated. 
2 The Authors are respectively, Senior Economist (AFTP2), World Bank Tanzania country office; and Lead 
Economist, (AFTP1), Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) unit in the Africa Region. All 
comments should be addressed to: jkweka@worldbank.org. 
  i 
  ii 
Table of Contents 
 
1  Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 
1.1  Background ...................................................................................................................1 
1.2  Objectives and structure of the report  ...........................................................................3 
2  Overview of the Economy and the Emerging Role of HEs in the Labor Market ..................5 
2.1  Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania  .................................................................5 
2.2  Trends in the Growth of Employment and HEs ...........................................................6 
2.3  Motivation for Having HEs ..........................................................................................9 
3  Key Characteristics and Productivity Drivers of Household Enterprises ............................12 
3.1  Characteristics of Household Enterprise Operators  ....................................................12 
3.2  Analysis of Productivity Drivers for HE Earnings .....................................................16 
4  Constraints and Risks Faced by Household Enterprises ......................................................20 
4.1  Types of Constraints ...................................................................................................20 
4.1.1  Constraints by Sector/Nature of Activity ....................................................... 20 
4.1.2  Constraints by Spatial Location ..................................................................... 21 
4.1.3  Seasonality Problem in the Rural Areas ........................................................ 21 
4.2  Lack of Credit .............................................................................................................22  
4.3  Business Premises and the Urban Planning Policy  .....................................................27 
4.3.1  Places for Conducting Business, by Location  ................................................ 27 
4.3.2  Implications of Urban Planning Policy of LGAs ........................................... 28 
4.3.4  The Machinga Problem .................................................................................. 30 
4.4  Operational Challenges and Livelihood Risks ...........................................................32 
4.5  Coping Strategies ........................................................................................................34 
4.6  Perception of Factors for Business Growth and Failure .............................................35 
5  Policies, Programs, and Institutions Affecting the HE sector ..............................................37 
5.1  Policies and Institutions on the Informal Sector .........................................................37 
5.1.1  Policy Dilemma.............................................................................................. 37 
5.1.2  Coordination Failure ...................................................................................... 38 
5.2  Licensing and the Regulatory Regime  ........................................................................40 
5.2.1  Laws and Regulations .................................................................................... 40 
5.2.2  Existing Challenges and the New Licensing Regime .................................... 41 
5.3  Existing Support Programs and Projects ....................................................................44 
5.4  Informal Sector Training (IST) for HEs .....................................................................46 
6  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations .........................................................................49 
   iii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1:  Typology of Concepts Used in the Informal Non-farm Sector  ...................................... 2 
Table 2.1:  Selected Economic Indicators (percent*) ...................................................................... 5 
Table 2.2:  Poverty Incidence (percent) ........................................................................................... 5 
Table 2.3:  Percent of Households Engaged in HE, by Area, 2006 ................................................. 9 
Table 2.4:  Percent of Households Engaged in HE, by Asset Quintile, 2006 .................................. 9 
Table 2.5:  Main Reason for Having an HE, by Economic Activity ............................................. 10 
Table 3.1:  Distribution of Recent Migrant Population in Urban Areas, by Job Type, 2006 
(percent) ......................................................................................................................................... 14 
Table 3.2:  Industry Distribution of HEs ....................................................................................... 15 
Table 3.3:  Types of HE Activities, by Sector, 2006 ..................................................................... 15 
Table 3.4:  Earnings Regressions (OLS) Model for HE Operators, by Gender ............................. 19 
Table 4.1:  Ranking of Constraints by Magnitude of Their Effect Across Different Groups of 
HEs, 2009  ....................................................................................................................................... 20 
Table 4.2:  Overall Infrastructure Constraints for Operating Rural Non-farm Enterprises, 2005 . 21 
Table 4.3:  Reasons for Not Running Household Enterprise All Year round, by Area, 2006 
(percent) ......................................................................................................................................... 22 
Table 4.4:  Credit Sources Among HE Operators and the Microenterprise Operators in the 
Informal Sector, 2006 (percent) ..................................................................................................... 24 
Table 4.5:  Place of Conducting Business Among HEs, 2006 (percent) ....................................... 28 
Table 4.6:  Relative Importance of Eviction as Traders' Most Memorable Experience, 2007 ...... 30 
Table 4.7:  HEs' Perceptions of Factors for Business Growth and Failure .................................... 35 




List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1:  Tanzania Labor Force Pyramid, 2006 (percent) ......................................................... 7 
Figure 2.2:  Employment Distribution in Urban Areas, 2006 ........................................................ 8 
Figure 2.3:  Growth of Employment by Type of Job, National, 2000/01 – 2006 .......................... 8 
Figure 3.1: Age Distribution, by Area and Employment Type, 2006 ............................................ 13 
Figure 3.2: Incidence of Training Among HE Operators, by Education Level, 2006 (percent) .... 14 
Figure 3.3:   Normalized Earnings by Employment Type and Gender, 2006 ................................ 17 
Figure 4.1:  Formal and Semi-formal Access Lags, Tanzania and Other East African Countries, 
2009* ............................................................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 4.2:  Growth of Commercial Bank Lending Against Personal and Household Access to 
Loans  .............................................................................................................................................. 24 
Figure 4.3:  Households that Took Out Loans, 2000/01-2007  ....................................................... 24 
Figure 4.4: Gender Distribution of Credit Sources Among HEs and Microenterprises, 2006....... 25 
Figure 5.1:  Distribution of Apprentices in Dar es Salaam, by Field (percent) ............................. 46 




List of Boxes 
 
Box 1.1: Main Data Sources ............................................................................................................ 4 
Box 2.1: Effects of the Decline in Agricultural Production on Rural Non-farm Enterprises ........ 11 
Box 3.1:  The Success Story of a Small Entrepreneur ................................................................... 16 
Box 4.1: The Vodacom's M-PESA Financial Services .................................................................. 27 
Box 4.2: Will the Machinga Complex Solve the Problem of Itinerancy in Dar es Salaam? ......... 31 
Box 4.3: Main Constraints Identified by VIBINDO, 2008 ............................................................ 33 
Box 4.4: Major Constraints Listed by the Sampled Enterprises in the Urban FGDs, 2009  ........... 33 
Box 4.5: Major Constraints Listed by the Sampled Enterprises in the Rural FGDs, 2009 ............ 34 
Box 5 1: Regulating Household Enterprises in Uganda ................................................................ 43 
Box 5 2: Studying the Impact of Microfinance and Training on Small Enterprises ...................... 44 
Box 5 3: Recent Media Report on the Massive Default Rate of the PEF (JK Billions) ................ 45 
Box 5 4: Training of HE and MSE Women in Food Preparation .................................................. 48 
Box 5 5: Government Financing of Rural Skills Development ..................................................... 48 
 v 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ACB      Akiba Commercial Bank 
BARA     Business Activities Registration Act 
BDS      Business Development Service 
BEST      Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania 
BOT      Bank of Tanzania 
BRAC     Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Tanzania 
BRELA     Business Registration Licensing Authority 
CEM      Country Economic Memorandum 
CRDB     Cooperative Rural Development Bank 
CSSC      Christian Social Services Commission 
DDSDP    Demand-driven Skill Development Program 
FBO      Faith-based Organizations 
FDC      Focal Development Colleges 
FGD      Focus Group Discussion 
FINCA    Foundation for International Community Assistance 
FSDT      Financial Sector Deepening Trust 
GEMA     Gender Education Management Association 
GTZ      Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
HBS      Household Budget Survey 
HE      Household Enterprise 
ISIC      International Standard Industrial Classification 
IST      Informal Sector Training 
ILFS      Integrated Labor Force Survey 
ITEP      Individual Training Evaluation Program 
LGA      Local Government Authority 
MDA      Ministries, Departments, and Agencies 
MFI      Microfinance Institutions 
MITM       Ministry of Industry and Trade, Marketing 
MKUKUTA    Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania  
      (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction) 
MKURABITA  Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge 
Tanzania (National Business and Property Formalization Program) 
MSME     Micro- and Small and Medium Enterprises 
MNRT     Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
M&E      Monitoring and Evaluation 
NACTE    National Council for Technical Education 
NSGRP    National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
NBS      National Bureau of Statistics 
NGO      Nongovernmental Organization 
NMP      National Microfinance Policy 
PIN      Personal Identification Number 
PMO      Prime Minister‟s Office 
PTF      Presidential Trust Fund 
PPA      Participatory Poverty Assessment vi 
 
PRIDE     Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises 
RAS      Regional Administrative Secretary 
ROSCA    Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
SACCO    Savings and Credit Cooperative Society 
SCCULT    Savings and Credit Cooperatives Union League of Tanzania 
SEWE     Self-Employed with Employees 
SIDO      Small Industry Development Organization 
SMS      Short Message System 
SME      Small and Medium Enterprises 
SPMDTF    Social Protection Multi-donor Trust Fund 
TFDA     Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority 
TFESSD  Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development 
TFP       Total Factor Productivity 
TGT      Tanzania Gatsby Trust 
TIN      Tax Identification Number 
TAZARA    Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority 
TRA      Tanzania Revenue Authority 
UDEC     University of Dar es Salaam Entrepreneurship Centre 
VETA     Vocational Education and Training Authority 
VIBINDO     Vikundi vya Biashara Ndogondogo 
VICOBA    Village Community Banks 
   WBI      World Bank Institute 
WDT      Women Development Fund 
 
   1 
1  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
1.  In the last decade, development policy has emphasized strategies aimed at attaining the 
twin  objectives  of  increasing  economic  growth  and  reducing  poverty.  As  an  alternative  to 
agriculture,  the  non-farm  informal  economy  has  become  an  important  vehicle  for  economic 
participation by the poor, thereby contributing to both growth and poverty reduction agendas of 
many countries.
3 Thus, a better understanding of the dynamics, constraints, and potentials of 
informal enterprises is essential for designing policies and interventions that can turn them into 
an engine of employment and income growth, rather than simply a mechanism for coping with 
vulnerability and sharing poverty. 
 
2.  However, an analysis of the informal sector is less straightforward. The informal sector is 
an extensive, often misunderstood concept that refers to conditions of employment or of firm 
behavior.    Informal  employment  is  likewise  subject  to  multiple  interpretations  as  many 
„informal‟ jobs exist even within companies in the formal sector, some of which pay regular 
wages. In general, informal workers are those who do not have a contract that is in accordance 
with labor regulations. Meanwhile, the firm side of the informal sector can include a variety of 
different types of enterprises, but informal firms are typically small-scale and may or may not be 
registered with government agencies of any kind. Viewed from an enterprise perspective, the 
definition of the informal sector omits the informal workers, in contrast with a labor market 
definition that captures them. There are also other important dimensions of size, such as capital 
outlays  or  turnover,  which  show  important  variations  within  each  category  of  informal 
enterprises.  These are often ignored when the size of an informal enterprise is defined mainly on 
the basis of the number of its employees (see Table 1.1). All these imply that a “one size fits all” 
approach is less useful in analyzing the informal sector. 
 
3.  This study focuses on the smallest informal firms, the household enterprises (HEs), as 
these entities are uniquely placed within the informal sector.  HEs represent both conditions of 
informal employment and informal enterprise. For the most part, they are started by a single 
entrepreneur so they create employment for the owner and establish small businesses within the 
household and the economy.  
 
4.  Household enterprises, as defined in household and labor surveys, consist of own-account 
operators and unpaid family workers. From the standpoint of enterprise surveys, they are tiny 
firms consisting of a single entrepreneur, perhaps working with unpaid workers who are likely to 
be family members.
4 In practice, many people may participate in HEs as a secondary activity, 
including farmers, civil servants, and schoolchildren.  Although this complicates the statistical 
picture, it means that HEs may be even more important for coping with and exiting poverty than 
would be suggested by data based only on primary occupations (Steel and Snodgrass, 2008).   
                                                           
3 See ILO (2002), Fox and Gaal (2008), and Heintz (2004).  
4 The term “nano enterprises” may also be applied to indicate that these are the lowest rung on the ladder of 
enterprise sizes, with no wage workers. 2 
 
Table ‎ 1.1:  Typology of Concepts Used in the Informal Non-farm Sector 
 




Individuals who operate a 
business by themselves or 
with the support of other 
members of the household, 
but without hiring any 
employees except on a casual 
basis. 
Unincorporated; this may 
mean that the finances of the 
enterprise are mixed with 
those of the household. 
  Own-account operator 
  Self-employed in a non-farm 
activity without employees 
  Unpaid family workers in a non-
farm activity 
Helpful to include the family 
employees in the definition as it is 
a household activity.  
Thus, the definition of “self 
employed in a non-farm activity 
without employees” is confusing 
unless employees is defined to 
exclude relatives. 
May or may not have any 
registration or license; may or 
may not operate full-time all year; 




As above, but employ at least 
one person outside of the 
family 
  Self-employed with employees 
  Own-account operator with 
employees 
  Unpaid family workers 
 
As above.  No size limitation. In 




People living in the household 
who work in the business. 
May also include close 
relatives not living in the 
household.  
  Unpaid family workers 
 
The adjective “unpaid” is often 
used without actually checking on 
how earnings are shared 
In our analysis, family workers 
are combined with other non-
wage workers, either in as farmers 
on in HEs  
Employee  A person who is paid to do a 
task for someone else in 
exchange for payment. 
  Employee in a wage job, paid in 
cash or kind 
Synonym is “job;” “employment” 
includes employee as well as 
employer and anyone engaged in 
nonwage economic activities, 
with or without remuneration 
Employer  Normally, the owner of 
business (incorporated or 
unincorporated) 
  Employer 
  Business-owner 
 
In principle, an HE owner with 
employees is an employer. But 
mostly, the term employer is used 
for a more established business.  
Informal employee  Definitions vary across 
countries, but normally 
workers who do not have a 
contract, or whose contract is 
not in accordance with the 
labor regulations and/or are 
not covered by the national 
social insurance system 
  Employee 
  Requires some information on the 
nature of contract, and benefits 
provided on the job 
 
Not related to the characteristics 
of the firm, only characteristics of 
the job; informal workers may 
work in informal firms 
Micro, small, and 
medium enterprises 
(MSMEs)  
Enterprises which may be 
incorporated and registered or 
not.  
Firm (in firm surveys)  Some include HEs with employee 
in microenterprises. Size 
categories vary across countries. 
Informal firm  Definition varies by country. 
Usually a firm which is not 
incorporated, licensed, or 
registered. May or may not 
have informal employees. 
Can include HEs if: 
  data is collected in household 
survey, and 
  survey instrument includes an 
enterprise model  
Some firm surveys (e.g., ICA) include 
small (micro) firms, which may be 
labeled as informal (criteria varies).  
These are usually not HEs, as they 
have nonfamily regular employees. 
Informality of firms has to be 
defined with respect to national 
regulations. An informal firm is 
not in compliance with 
regulations, regardless of size. But 
there tends to be a correlation 
with size of employment 
(although not with revenues).   
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5.  The HE sector reflects the efforts of farmers, peri-urban, and urban households to earn 
more income.  It is also their entry point into participation in private sector-led growth. Clearly, 
from the perspective of pro-poor growth policy, the sector presents a significant opportunity for 
policymakers to enhance complementarities, rather than tradeoffs, between poverty reduction 
and growth strategies. 
 
6.  Focusing on HEs triggers a key question relevant to pro-poor growth strategies: what 
measures can help poor households generate income and cope  with vulnerability in a labor-
surplus situation?  In response, the World Bank in the Africa region has embarked on a regional 
multi-country study to provide policymakers with a concrete set of policies that will enable the 
HE sector to have a bigger role in the economy as a major source of productive employment and 
enterprise  growth.   This  report presents  a  case  study of Tanzania‟s HEs,  which follows the 
methodology outlined by Steel and Snodgrass (2008). 
 
 
1.2   Objectives and Structure of the Report 
7.  Given its significant size in the non-agriculture labor market, the HE sector plays an 
important  role  in  job  creation,  but  the  sector  is  largely  ignored  in  Tanzania‟s  policy  and 
institutional framework, which generally focuses on the MSMEs in the informal sector. This gap 
weakens the potential of HEs to become major players in the country‟s poverty reduction efforts. 
Thus, the challenge is to understand the significance of HEs and to explore policy measures that 
recognize  them  as  a  strategic  sector  for  achieving  the  MKUKUTA‟s  twin  objectives  of 
increasing growth and reducing poverty. 
 
8.  In view of the above, this study has three main objectives. Since the overarching question 
is how to improve the productivity of HEs, the first objective is to profile them, i.e., we need to 
know who they are, where they are, what they do, and why they are formed. From a range of 
characteristics that define HEs, including the constraints and risks they face, the second objective 
is to determine the key productivity drivers in the HE sector in order to inform policy towards 
improving  its  overall  performance.  Finally,  the  study  seeks  to  analyze  existing  policies, 
programs, and projects affecting HEs in order to identify and propose measures by which support 
for them  can be improved. While this  Tanzania case study followed as much as possible  a 
diagnostic  methodology  framework,  the  actual  design  is  mainly  determined  by  available 
information and evidence from existing literature, taking into account the specific context in 
which HEs operate. 
 
9.  The report is  structured as  follows. Following  the introduction, Section 2 provides a 
background on the HE sector, and describes its role in the economy.  Section 2 profiles the HE 
operators and determines  the key  characteristics  that influence their productivity  and overall 
performance. Section 4 analyzes the different constraints and risks that HEs face, and the coping 
strategies they adopt in response to these problems. Section 5 reviews the policy and institutional 
environment within which HEs operate, including programs and projects that affect them directly 
or indirectly.  Finally, Section 6  concludes with  some recommended policy  actions  and next 
steps. 
   4 
 
Box 1.1: Main Data Sources 
 
This study used both existing data and literature available in Tanzania, as well as a special qualitative 
analytical work commissioned for the report.  
  The only household survey which contains data on HEs is the Integrated Labor Force Survey (ILFS). 
Using available data drawn  from the  two rounds of the  ILFS survey conducted by the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2000/01 and 2006), a quantitative analysis was conducted to identify the 
key features of the HE sector and its economic role, and to determine what drives or constrains their 
productivity. The two rounds of survey enabled understanding of the dynamics in the HE sector in 
general,  and  in  several  types  of  HEs  differentiated  by  spatial  location  (Dar  es  Salaam,  other 
secondary  urban,  and  rural  areas),  gender  (male-  and  female-operated),  industry  group  (trade, 
manufacturing, services), and other key characteristics. However, the coding of the spatial locations 
is not consistent in both surveys, so comparisons between the two surveys by area are biased and 
should be regarded with care. 
 
  To complement the quantitative analysis, a focus group discussion (FGD) survey was conducted to 
learn from HEs and from their experiences with running their business. The FGD survey was done in 
two phases. The first phase, conducted in March and April, 2009, focused on urban clusters in 9 
regions -- Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Dodoma, Singida, Kigoma, Mtwara, Kilimanjaro, Arusha and 
Mwanza.    The  second  phase,  launched  in  September,  2009,  covered  the  3  districts  of  Kilosa, 
Kwimba, and Masasi located in Morogoro, Mwanza and Mtwara regions, respectively. The narratives 
from the in-depth interviews of individuals and groups during the FGDs provide rich insights into the 
HE operators‟ perception of their needs, constraints, and coping strategies, as well as the impact of 
government policies, programs, and projects on them (see Kessy, 2010). 
 
  The  study  also  drew  on  existing  literature  on  the  informal  sector,  as  well  as  interviews  with 
Government officials, donors and NGOs involved in the sector. 
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2  Overview of the Economy and the Emerging Role of HEs in the Labor 
Market 
 
2.1  Growth and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania 
 
10.  Tanzania has achieved very modest gains in poverty reduction amidst sustained economic 
growth.
5 Over the last five years, the economy has grown at a rate of at least 5 percent per year 
(Table 2.1).  However, the most recent data shows a weak impact on consumption of key 
commodities; the percentage of the population in poverty fell from 35.6 in 2001 to 33.6 in 2007 
(Table 2.2).  
 
Table ‎ 2.1:  Selected Economic Indicators (percent*) 
 
 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009
. 
GDP growth   7.8  7.4  6.7  7.1  7.4  5.0 
Annual Inflation (CPI, period avg.)  4.7  5.0  7.2  7.0  10.2  11.9 
Private credit to GDP  8.5  9.7  12.1  14.9  16.2  19.5 
Current account balance to GDP  -2.9  -6.1  -8.0  -9.3  -12.3  -11.1 
Exchange rate (TSh per USD)  1043  1165  1266  1132  1259  1319 
Interest rate (T-Bond)  9.3  8.3  9.3  17.1  7.8  - 
Domestic Revenue to GDP  11.9  12.4  14.1  16.0  15.9  16.1 
Overall budget deficit to GDP (after grants)  -4.9  -4.9  -4.8  -1.6  -4.5  -6.1 
Domestic borrowing to GDP  1.0  1.5  1.2  -1.5  0.8  1.6 
Note: *unless otherwise specified 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, (various years); World Bank, 2010 
 
 
Table ‎ 2.2:  Poverty Incidence (percent) 
 
  1991  2001  2007 
Dar es Salaam  28.1  17.6  16.4 
Other urban  28.7  25.8  24.1 
Rural  40.8  38.7  37.6 
Tanzania Mainland  38.6  35.6  33.6 
    Source: World Bank, 2008b 
11.  Close to 850,000 new job-seekers enter the labor market every year. Recognizing this 
trend, job creation has become a flagship policy of the government. In the search for workable 
solutions, an analysis of the labor market is critical. With its growing share in the non-agriculture 
labor market, the household enterprise sector plays an essential role in job and income creation, 
and can provide a route out of poverty. 
   
                                                           
5 See Utz (2008). 6 
 
12.  However, the literature on the effectiveness of HEs in poverty reduction is limited as the 
focus of most existing studies on small enterprise development has been on MSMEs and the 
informal sector in general.  Yet the number of households with an HE is remarkably large. This 
signifies the importance of HEs to poor households as a livelihood strategy and as a means to 
supplement their income, and therefore a practical option for increasing their welfare.  
 
2.2  Trends in the Growth of Employment and HEs  
 
13.  By far, agriculture remained the main economic activity of the labor force in Tanzania in 
2006,  employing  77  percent  of  women  and  72  percent  of  men.    However,  within  the  non-
agriculture sector, when family helpers are included, the HE share in the labor force increased to 
over 50 percent for male and 75 percent for female (Figure 2.1). In urban areas in 2006, HEs 
employed a larger share of the labor force than wage employment, i.e., 40 percent, the largest 
category (Figure 2.2).    
 
14.  Non-farm sector employment has been growing very rapidly in Tanzania as incomes in 
agriculture  stagnate.  However,  despite  a  very  rapid  growth  in  non-farm  wage  employment, 
especially  in  urban  areas,  the  supply  of  labor  seeking  non-farm  employment  outpaced  the 
demand in the wage sector, leaving many labor force participants with no choice but to create 
their own employment. A comparison of data from the two rounds of the ILFS survey, 2000/01 
and 2006, shows that employment in the HE sector grew by 13 percent, higher than the overall 
change in the labor force and faster than the growth of wage employment in both non-agriculture 
and agriculture sectors (Figure 2.3).  
 
15.   Since the labor force perspective considers only one activity per individual, it understates 
the economic role of HEs. Even more remarkable than the importance and growth of HEs as a 
primary employment source is their role as secondary employment as Tanzania transitions from 
an agrarian economy. For individuals who declared a secondary employment, the overwhelming 
majority  cited  an  HE,  including  36  percent  of  the  labor  force  in  rural  areas  (Table  A1.5, 
Appendix  A).  Forty-two  percent  of  all  females  in  the  labor  force  cited  their  HE  as  their 
secondary  employment  (Table  A1.6).  Therefore,  although  only  16  percent  of  labor  force 
participants reported working in an HE as their primary employment, 66 percent of households 
in Tanzania ran some kind of a household enterprise, either as a primary or secondary activity 
(Table  2.3).  As  a  livelihood  source  for  households,  on  a  full-  or  part-time  basis,  HEs  are 
increasingly viewed as an alternative or complement to agriculture. In contrast, households in 
peri-urban areas rely much more on their HE as a source of livelihood given the limited wage 
employment opportunities, and less or no farming activities in these areas. 
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Figure 2.1:  Tanzania Labor Force Pyramid, 2006 (percent) 
 
 
          Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
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Figure 2.2:  Employment Distribution in Urban Areas, 2006 
 
 
                         Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Growth of Employment by Type of Job, National, 2000/01 – 2006 
(percent) 
 
     Note: Type of jobs refers to primary employment only.  
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Table ‎ 2.3:  Percent of Households Engaged in HE, by Area, 2006 
* Households where HE is the primary activity of at least one member.** Households with HE as a primary or 
secondary activity of at least one member.  Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
 
 
Table ‎ 2.4:  Percent of Households Engaged in HE, by Asset Quintile, 2006 
 
  
HE non-agriculture*  HE non 
-agriculture** 
Quintile 1  9.4  66.1 
Quintile 2  15.3  59.3 
Quintile 3  20.4  69.2 
Quintile 4  30.6  73.1 
Quintile 5  51.1  61.9 
Total  14.5  65.9 
 
Note: *   refers to HE as a primary activity 
          ** refers to HE as a primary or a secondary activity 
 
 Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
 
16.  Does running an HE reduce poverty? The evidence in Tanzania is not clear. The ILFS 
2006 data showed that both poor and non-poor households participate in HEs. The one panel 
study for Tanzania which analyzed this question found that in rural Kagera, adding an HE to a 
farm-based activity is indeed a successful route out of poverty, but only for those with access to 
towns and markets (De Weerdt, 2008). What we can see from our cross-sectional evidence is that 
when the HE is the primary activity of a household member, ownership of HEs is strongly 
correlated  with  higher  income  --  half  of  the  households  in  the  top  quintile  in  2006  had  a 
household enterprise as a full-time activity, compared with only 10 percent in the lowest quintile 
(Table 2.4). A separate study on non-farm rural household enterprises also came up with the 
finding that richer households own HEs (Jin and Deininger, 2008).  What is not known is if 
households had a successful enterprise because they were already richer (i.e., had the needed 
start-up and working capital) and could devote full-time attention to their HE, or if a successful 
enterprise allowed them to work full-time and move up the income ladder.  
 
2.3  Motivation for Having HEs 
 
17.  If it is not clear that an HE is a route out of poverty (or a way to stay out of poverty), why 
do households start and maintain one? The reasons provided by survey respondents vary widely, 
but can be grouped into “pull” factors -- they were attracted into the business, or “push” factors – 
1.3    1.4   
1.5   
HE as primary activity*  All HE*  
Dar  58.4  67.9 
Other urban  49.1  74.2 
Rural  13.0  63.5 
Total  24.4  65.9 10 
 
they  were  pushed  into  operating  an  HE  as  they  could  not  find  adequate  income-earning 
opportunities in either wage or agricultural employment. Although a combination of both may be 
at work, analysis of the ILFS data shows that push factors are more common, especially when an 
HE is a secondary activity (Table 2.5).  
 
Table ‎ 2.5:  Main Reason for Having an HE, by Economic Activity 
 
    Primary Activity  Secondary Activity 
    2000   2006  2000   2006 
PUSH FACTORS  %  %  %  % 
  Can‟t find other work  44.9  37.2  21.2  18.5 
  Released from employment  3.6  1.7  1.1  1.1 
  Retirement from employment  1.1  0.9  1.2  0.5 
  Family need for more income  24.7  31.6  43.5  55.9 
 
PULL FACTORS 
     
  Good business opportunities  6.6  11.8  8.5  9.0 
  Does not require much capital  7.8  7.4  10.2  7.2 
  Low production cost  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.5 
  Desire for independence  2.1  2.0  0.9  1.4 
  Free choice of work hours and place  2.3  1.6  3.2  1.4 
  Can combine business w/ housework  2.4  3.2  5.0  2.9 
  Traditional line of business of family  2.3  1.4  3.0  1.5 
  Other  1.7  0.9  2.0  0.4 
  Total  100  100  100  100 
 
Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2000/01 and 2006 data  
 
18.  For those engaged in HEs as their secondary activity, the primary reason for doing so was 
their family‟s need for additional income. This is not surprising as one would expect this need to 
be a strong motivation for seeking a second job generally. Informal sector arrangements are also 
more  conducive  to  part-time  work,  which  requires  lesser  time  commitment  than  a  primary 
occupation. The share of households driven into the HE sector as a secondary source of income 
rose by 12 percentage points during the 2000-2006 periods, indicating its increasing role as a 
source of livelihood. 
 
19.  More than two-thirds of HEs in the urban areas were formed because of lack of any other 
job  opportunities,  in  particular  wage  employment  providing  adequate  remuneration.  The 
dominant factor in the rural areas, on the other hand, was the need for a secondary source of 
income by households whose main activity was farming (Box 2.1).  
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Box 2.1: Effects of the Decline in Agricultural Production on Rural Non-farm Enterprises 
 
20.  In sum, the primary drive behind the growth of HEs in both rural and urban Tanzania is 
income diversification in an economy with limited option in the non-farm sector, rather than a 
latent wellspring of entrepreneurship which spots a great business opportunity. This, combined 
with evidence showing that very few graduate beyond HE status into a small business employing 
people outside the family, has led some authors to dismiss them as “survivalist” (see Kinda and 
Loening, 2009, for Tanzania; and Mead and Lindholm, 1998, for a survey of experiences in 
Africa  in  the  1990s).  However,  their  importance  in  absorbing  labor  in  the  economy,  and 
therefore  helping  people  to  work  more  hours  and  earn  more  cash,  cannot  be  understated. 
Previous studies have found that overall economic growth brings more HE and microbusiness 
activities, which are especially important for women as the flexibility of these activities allows 
them to produce household goods and earn income at the same time. It is expected that when 
more panel data become available (like those collected for Kagera as cited above), stronger 
evidence on the role of HEs in poverty reduction and economic development will emerge. 
1.6   
In the rural areas, agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises are so complementary that capital and labor for 
either activities flow reciprocally between the two groups of enterprises. Almost every operator of a non-farm 
enterprise is also a farmer. The entrepreneurs of Lukuledi Village gave evidence to this by saying: “During the 
rainy  season,  every  villager here  is  farming.  We,  who  have  non-farm  enterprises,  have  to  go  to  farm  in  the 
morning and do our non-farm activities in the afternoon. Even if we don‟t farm, we don‟t get anyone to buy from 
us since all our potential customers are away from the village center where we run our non-farm enterprises. In 
the afternoon some farmers buy from us, but we don‟t expect many of them since they hardly have money. Others 
are away from the village for several weeks to farm.”  
 
The complementary relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises was made clearer by one 
respondent who owned a shop and said: “I expect to circulate my money through agriculture so that my shop can 
flourish. Now that agriculture is limping, my shop is limping too.” 
 
Another one added: “Siku hizi, hasa 2007-09, pesa imepotea sana, ”which means: “These days, especially from 
2007 until now (2009), cash is not available.”  
 
The  discussants  further  explained  that  rural  entrepreneurs  depend  on  farmers.  They  have  to  earn  cash  from 
agriculture in order for them to buy their goods. They added that some entrepreneurs divert money from their 
enterprises and use it on agricultural production, ending up losing money from both activities in times of bad 
weather. They noted that rains had been less than in some years, resulting in a decline in agricultural productivity, 
income, and food security.  
 
One respondent who was selling petroleum products said:“These days, most people do not even buy kerosene; they 
use grass to light their houses. This is because they do not get good harvests for selling and boosting their 
household income.” 
 
That famine was looming was made evident by a concurrent open meeting while the focus group discussion was 
being held, to discuss how to distribute maize about to be received by the village as part of the food relief 
operation of the government.  
 
Narrated by a male participant, FGD, Masasi District  12 
 
3  Key Characteristics and Productivity Drivers of Household Enterprises  
 
3.1    Characteristics of Household Enterprise Operators 
 
21.  Demographic  profile.  Owing  to  high  fertility  and  therefore  high  rates  of  population 
growth, the majority of HE operators are young, though they tend to be slightly older relative to 
the country‟s labor force in general (Tables A1.7 and A1.8). Over half falls in the age group 15-
34 years. Between 2001 and 2006, however, the share of HE operators in the age group 15-24 
declined  by  three  percentage  points,  while  those    in  the  25-34  age  group  rose  by  about  3 
percentage points. As will be noted later, this youngest group is also associated with low levels 
of education, most likely because they left school early. Urban areas have a high density of labor 
force  in  the  age  range  25-34  because  of  migration  of  this  age  group  from  rural  areas.  In 
Tanzania, women and men are equally likely to start an HE. 
 
22.  Education and training profile. The level of education of HE operators is similar to that 
of the labor force in general (Table A1.9). Over 60 percent of them completed primary education 
only. Consistent with an overall low level of education in rural areas, a higher share of HE 
operators in the rural areas had no education (24 percent), or completed primary education only 
(17 percent), compared to Dar es Salaam with 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively (Table 
A1.7).    
 
23.  ILFS data show that more than 80 percent of HEs have never had any training of any 
kind,  with  a  mere  4  percent  having  attended  on-the-job  (onsite)  training.  Vocational  and 
apprenticeship training is the main form of training for about 12 percent of HEs. The proportion 
of HEs without training increased, but only in the rural areas, even as the share of those who 
received on-the-job training rose between 2000 and 2006.  
 
24.  More educated HE operators tend to acquire training as well, indicating that training is 
not a substitute for lack of education. .Only 5 percent of HE operators with no education report 
having had training, whereas the share of those with training increases up to 68 percent for the 5 
percent of HE operators with advanced secondary or university-level education (Figure 3.2). 
Recent  research  suggests  that  even  in  the  informal  apprenticeship  system  where  the  formal 
education requirements may appear less stringent, formal education is an important determinant 
of  HE  operators‟  acceptance  into  training  programs.
6  This  raises  concerns  about  their 
opportunities for further skill acquisition, let alone their prospects for formal sector employment. 
Fox and Gaal (2008) argue that at least some post -primary education is generally required to 
obtain a job in the formal sector or to upgrade their skills.  
   
                                                           
6 See Kahyarara and Teal (2008) 13 
 










Note:  Employment type is based on primary employment only.  
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data  
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Figure 3.2: Incidence of Training Among HE Operators, by Education Level, 2006 (percent) 
 
   
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
 
25.  Migration  profile.  HEs  provide  recent  migrants  with  economic  opportunities  in  the 
urban areas. Although many migrants find private sector wage and salary jobs (they have a 
higher proportion in these jobs because they are, on average, more educated that non-migrants), 
in 2006, about 40 percent of HE operators in Dar es Salaam and in other urban areas were 
migrants (Table 3.1).  
 
Table ‎ 3.1:  Distribution of Recent Migrant Population in Urban Areas, by Job Type, 2006 (percent) 
 
  Dar    Other urban 
  Not migrant  Migrant  Total    Not migrant  Migrant  Total 
Public wage non-agri  6.8  4.3  6.4    5.5  9.9  6.1 
Private wage non-agri  25.0  36.0  27.0    13.7  27.2  15.3 
HE non-agri  47.6  39.6  46.2    34.4  40.9  35.2 
wage agri  0.7  3.0  1.1    0.7  1.9  0.8 
Family farming  19.9  17.2  19.4    45.8  20.2  42.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: Job type refers to primary employment only .Migrant indicates a migration in the last 5 years only. 
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2000/01 and 2006 data 
 
 
26.  Sectoral and Occupational Distribution of HEs: Although HEs operate in different 
sectors, there is a high concentration in certain sectors or activities. In 2006, over 70 percent of 
HEs in the urban areas and more than 60 percent in the rural areas were in small businesses 
related to trade, hotels, and restaurants. These activities have no or low barriers to entry, and are 
highly competitive. However, HEs are increasingly diversifying out of the trade sector.  Between 
2001  and  2006,  the  share  of  HEs  engaged  in  trade  declined  (Table  3.2).  Following  a 
transformation in the economy, more changes in the sectoral distribution of HEs can be expected 
as HEs develop new expertise and operate in other areas. 
0  .2  .4  .6  .8 
Advanced secondary / univ 
Completed ord. secondary 
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Table ‎ 3.2:  Industry Distribution of HE 
1.7    2006  Change 2001-2006 (Percentage points) 
   Rural 
All 
Urban  Total  Rural  All Urban  Total 
   %  %  %  %  %  % 
Agric., Hunting, Forestry, Fishing  2.6  1.0  1.9  -1.0  0.4  -0.4 
Mining, Manufacturing, Energy  26.6  17.5  23.0  9.5  8.9  9.5 
Construction  2.4  2.9  2.6  -3.1  -3.1  -3.1 
Trade, hotels, restaurants  62.1  71.1  65.6  -6.7  -4.5  -6.0 
Transport, storage, real estate  2.2  2.8  2.4  1.7  1.5  1.6 
Public and social/person. Services  4.2  4.7  4.4  -0.4  -3.2  -1.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0          
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2000/01 and 2006 data. 
 
27.  Although not based on a representative sample, Table 3.3 enriches the sectoral picture by 
showing data from the FGD study. HEs are categorized according to three major non-agriculture 
sectors (manufacturing, trading, and services) on the basis of the participants‟ description of their 
activities. Not surprisingly, a substantial number of HEs are engaged in some form of trade. Next 
in importance are manufacturing enterprises. This sectoral structure is in part a reflection of the 
ease  of  entry  into  informal  trading  (see  Box  3.1),  but  also  of  the  constraints  HEs  faced  in 
undertaking production and other activities requiring electricity, fixed premises, labor, and skills.  
  
Table ‎ 3.3:  Types of HE Activities, by Sector, 2006 
 
Trading  Manufacturing  Services 
Activity   Incidence  Activity   Incidence  Activity   Incidence 
Selling roasted/fried cashew nuts  2  Tailoring  8  Motorcycle repair  2 
Selling water  3  Making snacks  2  Video shows  1 
Selling sugarcane juice  1  Restaurant  18  Decorations  1 
Selling belts for clothing  1  Food vending  4  Women‟s hair saloon  2 
Selling socks and wallets  1  Juice making and selling  1  Motor vehicle mechanics  1 
Selling fruits and vegetables  9  Masonry  1  Transport (bodaboda)  3 
Dealer in used clothes  7  Carpentry  2  Pharmacy  2 
Selling cellular phone SIM cards 
and air-time vouchers 
4  De-husking cashew nuts 
 
1  IT equipment and video 
cassette hiring 
3 
Selling cooking stoves  1  Food processing  2     
A small shop/genge
7  20  Local brew making   1     
Fish retailing  3  Milling machine  4     
Vending water  1  Carpentry       
Selling local chicken/guinea fowls  2         
Selling soft and alcoholic drinks  4         
Selling petroleum products  1         
Importing maize from Mozambique 
and selling  
2         
Selling upupu
8  1         
 
Source:  FGD report, 2009  
                                                           
7 Note that in a genge, food products like sardines, tomatoes, onions, as well as other items like soap are sold. 
8 Upupu is a wild legume cooked for 10 to 15 hours and is consumed during periods when there is shortage of food. 
It is poisonous, if improperly cooked. 16 
 
28.  When grouped by occupation, a similar distribution of HEs is also evident.  Using the 
ILFS data, results suggest that more than 75 percent of HEs are in just two categories of activity: 
service shopkeepers and craftsmen. Owing to lack of education, the number of HEs providing 
professional services is low, i.e., hardly 2 percent of the total (Table A1.10). Most workers with 
high levels of education prefer to work in firms.  
 
Box 3.1:  The Success Story of a Small Entrepreneur 
 
 
The 25-year old Hafsa Hassan from Matwara used her TSh 150,000 savings to start a business buying and selling 
cashew nuts.  In 2003, she joined the Matwara Small Entrepreneurship Development Association (MSEDA) from 
where she was able to get a TSh 500,000 loan to expand her business, and avail of various training opportunities, 
including study tours with SIDO, ILO, and other NGOs. With only 25 kilogram of cashew nuts to sell at start-up, 
Hafsa is currently trading on more than 250 kilograms of cashew nuts and has a working capital of more than TSh 
1.5 million. Commenting on the reasons why her business is doing well, she remarked: 
 
“Unahitaji kuwa mbunifu na mtafutaji wa misaada kama unataka kufanikiwa kama mjasiriamali mdogo. Nilianza 
kidogo  kidogo,  lakini  nilihakikisha  natafuta  taarifa  muhimu  kuhusu  maendelea  ya  biashara  kokote  nilikosikia. 
Nilipoingia MSEDA ikawa ndiyo kama Mungu kanifungulia….nilikutana na wenzangu, tukabadilishana mawazo na 
uzoefu. Tulipata mafunzo kutoka sehemu mbalimbali. Kwa sasa naweza kusema mimi ni kati ya kinamama ambao 
ukija miaka michache ijayo utakuta nina kampuni  yangu ya kubangua na kuuza korosho.” This means, “You need 
to be creative and look for where you can get assistance if you want to succeed as a small entrepreneur. I started 
with a small capital, but I was constantly looking for important information and opportunities that could help me 
succeed. When I joined MSEDA, it was like God opening the door for me. I met several entrepreneurs and we 
exchanged ideas and also got training from several sources. I can go so far as to say that I am one of few women 
who, when you come back here a few years from now, will be owning a factory, and in my case, my own cashew 
nut processing factory.” 
 
Source: Narratives from the FGD report, 2009.  
 
3.2  Analysis of Productivity Drivers for HE Earnings 
 
29.   HE  operators  enter  the  business  to  gain  income.  Does  running  an  HE  pay  off?  
Unfortunately, the ILFS data set does not include agricultural income so a comparison cannot be 
made between earnings from HEs and from the alternative for most of the labor force in rural 
areas  --  agriculture.  However,  when  comparing  HE  earnings  with  those  from  other  non-
agricultural  employment  options,  HE  is  not  a  poor  choice.  Although  public  employment  is 
obviously a better choice in Tanzania, 95 percent or more of HE operators do not have the 
qualifications for these jobs (see Table A1.9). Not surprisingly, if an HE is able to graduate to an 
MSE, reported earnings tend to rise. For women, the median hourly earnings appear to be higher 
than those from a wage job in the private sector, even though HE earnings tend to be under-
measured  compared  to  wage  earnings  (Figure  3.3).  Moreover,  if  agricultural  wage  earnings 
approximate the alternative of agriculture, both men and women do better in non-agricultural 
activities, including HEs.  
 
30.  To determine in more detail which of the various characteristics of HE operators support 
increased earnings, a multivariate analysis was done separately for men and women. Table 3.4 17 
 
reports the regression of the natural logarithm of hourly earnings
9 on a range of HE operators‟ 
characteristics  (using  this  specification  means  that  the  coefficients  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
percentage effect on earnings). 
 
Figure 3.3:   Normalized Earnings by Employment Type and Gender, 2006
 
         Note: Reference category = public wage employment, non-agriculture 
 
           Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data.  
 
 
31.  Not surprisingly, education is found to have a strong effect on earnings, although there 
are  clear  diminishing  returns.  HE  operators  without  complete  primary  education  are  clearly 
disadvantaged.
10 For example, for a male HE operator, completing primary education increases 
earnings by 23 percent at the mean, but completing ordinary secondary education adds only one 
percent more. This is not surprising, as few HE operators have reached this level of education.  
The returns to highest levels of education are significantly greater, but very f ew HE operators 
have  education  beyond  primary  school  (less  than  one  percent  has  gone  beyond  ordinary 
secondary). Age (a proxy for experience) adds much more to the earnings of male HE operators 
than of female HE operators. Migration status, however, has no effect on earnings. 
 
                                                           
9 Hourly earnings are obtained by taking the net earnings of enterprises divided by the hours reported by all those 
who worked in these enterprises.  One concern regarding the measure of hourly earnings for the self-employed is 
that  earnings  are  qualitatively  different  from  wages,  i.e.,  they  include  remuneration  for  capital  and  for 
entrepreneurial risk. The data does not allow us to address the latter concern. With regard to earnings, the potential 
bias is likely to be minor. 
10 Obviously, the coefficient on “complete primary” could be picking up other factors than education;  in other 
words, there may be a selectivity issue. Clearly, there is a selectivity issue into operating an HE, but we were unable 
to pick up anything other than education as a selection variable. Education is by far the strongest predictor of 



















32.  Trading, the most popular sector, is still a good choice for HE operators. Only two sectors 
-- mining and construction -- appear to generate more earnings for male-run HEs, and one sector 
– hotels and restaurants -- for female-run HEs. Note that with training, however, hotels and 
restaurants generate positive returns for men. 
 
33.   Other authors have found that access to infrastructure matters a lot for HE profitability 
(e.g., Jin and Deininger, 2008). However, these correlations are difficult to interpret since clearly 
infrastructure comes first to richer areas (e.g., Dar es Salaam). In our regression analysis, local 
conditions are very important in determining earnings. The coefficients on Dar es Salaam and on 
Other Urban areas are positive. in addition, the fixed effects variables account for the majority of 
the variance explained by the regression. This may be why we did not find access to electricity, 
to be significant, but we did find that being near a market matters to female HE operators.  As 
noted above, De Weerdt (2008) found that rural households living near towns were much more 
likely to be successful in using an HE as a route out of poverty. 
 
34.  Surprisingly, apprenticeship training does not help earnings, and more formal types of 
training tend to help only male HE operators. The effect of training on earnings is also difficult 
to isolate as it involves a certain element of omitted variable – what is it that causes people to go 
get training in the first place? Some authors have found that training comes up negative in these 
types of regression because only poorly educated people go for training (Kahyarara and Teal, 
2008).  Testing this  with  the  ILFS 2006 data, training is  found to  be a fairly rare event  in 
Tanzania – only about 10 percent of female HE operators and 18 percent of male HE operators 
had any training at all. Those who received training tended to be concentrated in a few sectors. 
To clarify the effect of training on earnings, interaction terms between training and the sector of 
activity were included in the regression. The results show that indeed in some sectors training 
can increase earnings, but not for women HE operators. This is most likely because in Tanzania, 
the training sector is still quite underdeveloped. In Ghana, where the apprenticeship sector is 
more developed, similar analysis showed strong positive results for informal training for both 
male- and female HE operators. 
 
35.  What do these findings mean for policy efforts to increase the productivity and earnings 
of HE operators? The picture is less clear since the information available from the ILFS can only 
explain about 30 percent of the variation in HE earnings (compared with over 60 percent for 
wage-earners in Fox and Novella, 2011). Obviously, other variables not measured in the data set 
matter a lot for HEs‟ success. What is clear is that for now, wage and salary employment in 
Tanzania  is  mostly  not  available  for  those  without  at  least  secondary  school  qualifications.  
Those with these qualifications tend to find a wage and salary job, and thus for them staying in 
the  HE  sector  does  not  pay  off  relative  to  the  costs  of  school.  For  primary  school  leavers, 
however, operating an HE is likely to be the only alternative to agriculture. Since they make up 
the  majority  of  new  entrants  to  the  labor  force,  and  given  the  shortage  of  placements  in 
secondary schools, the crucial question is how to make this economic activity pay off. The next 
sections will examine this issue using information mainly from other data sets, such as those 
collected from the qualitative FGD study. 
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Table ‎ 3.4:  Earnings Regressions (OLS) Model for HE Operators, by Gender 
1.8    Males  Females 
Age  0.056***  0.028*** 
 
(0.007)  (0.007) 
Age2  0.065***  0.034*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.008) 
Education (reference: no education) 
         Incomplete Primary  0.070  -0.020 
 
(0.074)  (0.066) 
     Completed Primary  0.226***  0.104* 
 
(0.064)  (0.055) 
     Incomplete Secondary  0.247*  0.220 
 
(0.129)  (0.150) 
     Completed  Ordinary Secondary  0.245**  0.315*** 
 
(0.097)  (0.117) 
     Some or completed Adv. Secondary and Tertiary  0.644***  0.459 
 
(0.195)  (0.390) 
Recent migrant  -0.011  0.071 
 
(0.061)  (0.064) 
Market within 30 min  -0.027  0.163** 
 
(0.086)  (0.081) 
# Months business operates  -0.014*  -0.003 
 
(0.007)  (0.007) 
Training (Omitted category: no training)       
On job/informal apprenticeship  0.004  0.031 
 
(0.068)  (0.098) 
Other(vocational/college/diploma/other)  0.213**  0.138 
 
(0.097)  (0.129) 
Industry (Omitted category: wholesale/retail trade)       
Manufacturing,  Energy  0.334***  -0.129** 
 
(0.070)  (0.059) 
Mining, Construction  0.298***  0.276* 
 
(0.088)  (0.144) 
Hotels / restaurants  -0.314***  0.100** 
 
(0.088)  (0.049) 
Transport, storage, real estate  -0.007  -0.099 
 
(0.086)  (0.807) 
Public, social, personal services  0.159*  0.256* 
 
(0.095)  (0.131) 
INTERACTIONS       
Training*manufacturing  0.219**  0.114 
 
(0.109)  (0.131) 
Training*Construction, mining  -0.164  - 
 
(0.143)  - 
Training*Hotels / restaurants  0.522**  - 
 
(0.257)  - 
Training* Public, social, personal services  -  0.137 
 
-  (0.253) 
Area of Residence (reference: rural)       
Dar  0.456*  1.011* 
 
(0.274)  (0.549) 
Other urban  3.093***  4.957*** 
 
(0.315)  (0.593) 
Constant  3.380***  3.366*** 
 
(0.310)  (0.563) 
Observations  3526  3207 
R-squared  0.28  0.32 
 
Notes: The regression takes includes (i) EA s and (ii) quarter of the survey, as fixed effects, however these coefficients are 
not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.   Significance level: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01.  
 
Source:  ILFS, 2006. 20 
 
4  Constraints and Risks Faced by Household Enterprises 
 
36.  Household enterprises face constraints and risks that inhibit their growth and trap them at 
a low level of productivity.  When analyzing them, several important points should be borne in 
mind.   First, HEs differ by location, nature of activity, and characteristics of operators, and may 
therefore be affected differently by different constraints.  While recognizing these differences, it 
is certain that some constraints are most binding across all HEs. Second, while the study seeks to 
identify  the  many  constraints  HEs  face  in  operating  their  business,  the  focus  is  more  on 
highlighting the underlying differences  in  how they are affected by these constraints.  Third, 
some operational difficulties faced by HEs are cited as constraints, but may in fact be a reflection 
of the HE operators‟ weak capacity to do business, the unfavorable business environment in 
which  they  operate,  and/or  their  frustration  with  the  government‟s  failure  to  support  them. 
Finally, the analysis of the constraints, risks, and coping strategies of HEs are based primarily on 
data drawn from the ILFS and the FGD surveys, but also made use of the limited literature 
available, most notably the studies conducted by Jin and Deininger (2008) and by Lyons and 
Msoka (2007).  
 
37.  Lack of access to credit (hence the lack of capital) was the most often reported constraint 
by HEs.  This is not surprising, as it also applies across the MSME sector (Skof, 2008). Another 
most commonly cited constraint is the lack of workspace to conduct business. Because of their 
pervasiveness, these two issues are given greater prominence in the analysis that follows.  
 
4.1   Types of Constraints 
 
4.1.1  Constraints by Sector/Nature of Activity 
 
38.  Some of the most binding constraints faced by HEs are specific to the nature of their 
activity.  Business  premise,  power,  and  technology  constraints  are  most  binding  among  HEs 
engaged in manufacturing. HEs in the trading sector contend with constraints imposed by market 
competition, regulation (or corruption in the regulatory system), and the risk of theft (Table 4.1).  
How  market  location,  corruption,  and  lack  of  workspace  adversely  affect  the  hawkers 
(Machingas) will be discussed later in more detail. 
 
Table ‎ 4.1:  Ranking of Constraints by Magnitude of Their Effect Across Different Groups of HEs, 2009 
 
Constraint  Hawking  





Business premise  3  1  4 
Market location/competition  1  4  1 
Power (electricity)  5  2  5 
Technology  6  3  6 
Crime/theft  4  5  3 
Regulation/corruption  2  6  2 
Key issue  Profitable to look for spot 
customers, mostly on street 
Earnings are drained by high 
rentals and power shading 
Located in-house, limited 
customers, often visited by officials 
 
Note: 1 means most important; 6 means least important. 
 
Source: FGD report, 2009  
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39.  Constraints imposed by market competition affect HEs in two different ways. First, a 
large number of HEs sell similar products or services, and compete for the same limited number 
of customers, hence their turnover is low. Second, as is the case with the rest of the economy, 
increased imports of products (mainly from Asia) threaten the survival of HEs manufacturing 
similar products locally, although HEs involved in trading as well as all Tanzanian consumers 
gain. Thus, while the first type of competition adversely affects HEs in the trade and distribution 
sector, the second type has opposite effects on production- and trade-related HEs.  
 
4.1.2  Constraints by Spatial Location  
 
40.  When  location  and  availability  of  infrastructure  are  considered,  some  HEs  are  more 
disadvantaged than others. Access to electricity and transport differ significantly by region. In 
the Kilimanjaro region,  79 percent of households have access to electricity, compared to 15 
percent  in  Kigoma  and  21  percent  in  Mtwara.
11  While close to half of the households in 
Kilimanjaro have public transport to markets, no such facility is available in Kigoma and only 3 
percent were served in Mtwara. Half of the households in Kilimanjaro are connected to mud 
external road, compared to 77 percent in Mtwara and 75 percent of households in Kigoma (Table 
4.2). Overall, about half of all rural households are connected to mud roads only, indicating that 
the country‟s road infrastructure remains underdeveloped (Table A1.12).  The share of rural non-
enterprise households thus connected is higher (55 percent) relative to rural households with HEs 
(50 percent). 
 
Table ‎ 4.2:  Overall Infrastructure Constraints for Operating Rural Non-farm Enterprises, 2005 
 
Source: Calculations based on the NBS/World Bank 2005 RIC Survey data 
 
41.  For  urban  HEs,  shortage  of  land  or  business  premise  is  one  of  their  most  critical 
constraints, a factor that led many of them to hawking as a last resort. Moreover, as rental price 
increases  with  the  size  of  potential  market,  most  HEs  are  pushed  into  smaller  markets  or 
temporary structures in unauthorized locations. 
   
4.1.3  Seasonality Problem in the Rural Areas 
   
42.  Seasonality is a critical feature of HEs, especially those in rural and peri-urban areas. In 
2006, only about 40 percent of HEs who had been in existence for at least one year reported 
operating all 12 months. Many of those who operated less than 12 months are in rural areas.  
                                                           
11 Note that lack of access to electricity is a key constraint, and a more strategic area for intervention to increase the 
productivity of HEs. Jin and Deininger (2008) report that rural and semi-urban households with access to electricity 

























Region  39.1  50.0  14.4  48.2  15.5  6.1  19.3  20.9  1230 
Kilimanjaro  18.4  78.8  44.9  49.8  12.2  6.9  18.1  20.2  113 
Morogoro  84.0  40.2  27.4  37.1  19.4  7.7  20.6  19.2  238 
Mtwara  59.2  20.7  3.3  76.9  16.5  7.6  28.5  19.5  199 
Mbeya  19.3  67.5  8.3  30.8  12.7  5.8  13.8  17.3  285 
Tabora  27.1  48.7  0.0  45.0  21.1  6.6  20.2  27.1  142 
Kigoma  53.3  15.2  0.0  75.0  11.9  3.2  17.2  20.2  130 
Kagera  46.9  42.6  9.9  33.2  20.5  2.8  17.1  25.2  123 22 
 
These are HEs run by households whose primary activity is agriculture, and thus have to adapt to 
the  seasonality  of  business  activity  and  income  (see  Box  2.1  in  Section  2).  However,  the 
proportion of households affected by their HE‟s seasonal operation vary, depending on whether 
or not it is the main activity of the HE operator or the secondary occupation. For those whose 
HEs are their secondary activity, 31 percent did not run their business year-round because of 
their farm work, compared to only 12 percent of those whose main activity is running their HEs 
(Table 4.3).   
 
43.  Perhaps reflecting their different motivations for engaging in HEs, the two groups of HE 
operators also differ in their other reasons for operating seasonally. Those who‟s HEs are their 
primary activity contend more with the problem of limited market especially in the rural areas 
(22.4 percent of them, compared to 15 percent of those engaged in HEs as a secondary activity). 
They also attribute their seasonality to personal reasons (e.g., illness, sad or happy social events) 
more  than  those  engaged  in  HEs  as  a  secondary  activity  (18.3  percent  and  5  percent, 
respectively). Note that some HEs reported operating less than a full year because they are less 
than a year-old. 
Table ‎ 4.3:  Reasons for Not Running Household Enterprise All Year round, by Area, 2006 (percent) 
 
  Main economic activity  Secondary economic activity 









                 
Business created within 12 months  21.3  25.1  28.7  24.0  17.9  17.3  19.9  17.9 
Limited market  16.6  27.0  28.5  22.4  13.8  24.1  17.1  15.0 
Lack of inputs  9.4  8.8  6.5  8.7  11.8  5.5  18.1  11.2 
Seasonal / temp activity  18.8  9.3  7.7  13.4  20.0  19.4  11.1  19.7 
Other work (agric.)  18.5  8.2  1.3  11.8  31.5  28.2  28.3  31.1 
HH demands  1.8  0.7  1.7  1.4  0.4  0.0  1.3  0.4 
Personal, other reasons  13.7  20.9  25.5  18.3  4.7  5.4  4.0  4.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
   Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
 
44.  Regardless of causal factors, it is worth noting that seasonality sometimes affects the 
earning capacity of HEs (Table 3.4 in Section 3 finds a very small negative effect, but significant 
for males only). Among rural HE operators, poor agricultural performance was cited as one of 
the  main  reasons  why  they  operate  their  HEs  seasonally  (see  Box  2.1  in  Section  2).  Not 
surprisingly, their business turnover is very small, if any, during the agricultural season. When 
the rains are erratic and they do not produce enough, their cash flow is reduced to a minimum, 
which in turn adversely affects the operations of their HEs.  Conversely, rural HEs thrive during 
good agriculture season when farm income augments HEs‟ capitalization and local demand for 
farm goods is high.   
4.2  Lack of Credit 
   
45.  Although lack of credit is a common problem across all enterprises in Tanzania, HEs are 
particularly vulnerable,
12 mainly because they are left  out  of the financial  sector  and policy 
interventions have been less effective. Overall, access to finance is stunted in Tanzania. Data 
                                                           
12 In many studies, lack of credit is found to be the most stringent constraint binding HEs from growing and being 
more productive. For instance, during the FGD survey, participants in every session mentioned lack of capital or 
credit as the most important constraint they face, at times associating the visit by the study team with assistance that 
is forthcoming. 23 
 
from  the  FinScope  survey  show  that,  compared  to  other  neighboring  countries,  access  to 
financial services in Tanzania is notably low. In 2009, 56 percent of households had no access to 
any banking or savings/credit services  at  all in  any form despite the sharp  growth  in  credit 
lending to households in recent years (Figures 4.1 to 4.3). 
  
46.  Reforms in the financial sector have had only marginal impact on improving household 
access to financial services overall. While formal access to finance increased by less than 4 
percentage  points  (from  9  percent  of  the  population  in  2004  to  12.4  percent  in  2009),  the 
proportion  of  financially  excluded  households  increased  from  54  percent  to  56  percent, 
respectively (Figure 4.1). Among HEs, access to banks was limited to only about 14 percent of 
them.  Of those without bank access, about 80 percent were in the urban areas and 90 percent in 
the rural areas (Table A1.13).  Lack of bank access was attributed by respondents mainly to 
economic reasons, such as not having a regular income or employment, or having very little 
income. However, this also reflects the low access of Tanzanian households to cheap financial 
services. The high bank charges prevalent among commercial banks, the only ones which can 
take deposits, dissuade HEs from using their services. Most HEs reported in 2009 that they 
depended  on  informal  sources,  such  as  rotating  savings  scheme  (e.g.,  merry-go-round  or 
ROSCA), family or clan, and welfare groups, rather than on formal and semi-formal sources of 
finance (Table A1.14). This implies that ten years after the National Microfinance Policy (NMP) 
was  created  (2001)  and  twenty  years  since  the  liberalization  of  Tanzania‟s  financial  sector, 
government  interventions  to  increase  access  to  financial  services  (including  through 
microfinance), especially for Tanzania‟s rural population, remain largely ineffective.  
 
Figure 4.1:  Formal and Semi-formal Access13 Lags, Tanzania and Other East African Countries, 2009* 
   
       Note: *unless otherwise specified 
                                                  Source: FinScope Survey, 2009 
                                                           
13  People with “formal” access include those who hold an account in or have some sort of relationship with a 
financial institution, such as a commercial bank, community bank, or insurance company that is supervised by a 
financial services regulator; and also people who use products from formal institutions such as pension fund or hire 
purchase companies  which are not supervised by either the Bank of Tanzania or the Insurance Commissioner.  
“Semi-formal” access includes people who use products from SACCOs and MFIs which are formally registered, but 
not supervised by a financial service regulator; and people who use products from institutions offering financial 
services other than SACCOs and MFIs.  These institutions have a formal character, but are not supervised by a 
financial  service  regulator.    This  category  includes  M-Pesa  and  government  loans  for  housing  and  education.  
“Informal” access includes people who use products offered by informal associations or groups, e.g., ROSCAs, 
VSLAs,  and  other  community-based  savings  groups,  family  and  friends,  small  businesses  and  moneylenders.  
“Financially excluded” are those who keep their savings in a secret hiding place (e.g., under the mattress) and/or 
who  save  in  the  form  of  nonmonetary  items  (e.g.,  livestock,  jewelry)  and/or  who  use  loyalty  card  from  a 
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Figure 4.2:  Growth of Commercial Bank 
Lending Against Personal and Household    
Access to Loans      
Figure 4.3:  Households that Took Out Loans 
         2000/01-2007                                                                                            
 
Source: Bank of Tanzania, 2009      Source: Household Budget Survey, 2007 
 
47.  The ILFS 2006 data corroborate the finding that access to finance by HEs (especially 
those in the rural areas) are severely limited. Only 7 percent of operators with HEs as their main 
activity reported having received credit from anyone – bank or relative - in the last 12 months, 
against 13 percent of microenterprise owners. Only 9 percent of all households had access to 
formal credit, most of whom are urban households. 
 
48.  Of the HEs who received credit, 48 percent obtained it from relatives, compared to 22 
percent of microenterprises. While borrowing from relatives is much more common in rural and 
secondary urban areas, it is less so in Dar es Salaam, where only 28 percent of HE operators 
reported it as a source of credit over the last year. For another 30 percent of HEs in Dar es 
Salaam,  credit  sources  are  business  associations,  NGOs,  or  donor  projects,  a  much  higher 
proportion  than  in  rural  or  secondary  urban  areas.  Credit  from  banks  and  other  financial 




Table ‎ 4.4:  Credit Sources Among HE Operators and the Microenterprise Operators in the Informal Sector, 
2006 (percent) 
 
  HEs  Microenterprises 
  Rural  Secondary Urban  Dar es Salaam  Total  Total 
                
Relative or friend  55.6  49.1  27.7  48.2  21.8 
Rotating savings & credit group (UPATU)  11.3  4.8  9.1  8.6  5.4 
Savings and credit co-operative (SACCO)  14.1  13.3  15.6  14.1  16.6 
Business association, NGO, donor project  9.8  13.2  29.2  14.6  11.9 
Bank or financial institution  2.2  7.4  10.2  5.6  18.9 
Other sources  6.9  12.1  8.3  9.0  25.3 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
 
  Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data  
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49.  The  incidence  of  receiving  credit  is  higher  among  women-operated  HEs  (11  percent 
versus  5  percent  among  male-operated  HEs).  A  larger  share  received  credit  from  business 
associations, NGOs, or donor projects, i.e., 17 percent of women-operated HEs, compared to 11 
percent  of  male-run  HEs  (Table  A1.15),  which  likely  reflects  the  focus  of  microfinance 
institutions on lending to women. The share of those with access to loans from savings and credit 
cooperatives is also larger among women (Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Gender Distribution of Credit Sources Among HEs and Microenterprises, 2006 
 
 
    Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
50.  Lack of access to credit for HEs is often caused by lack of a successful business strategy 
or  investment,  which  would  yield  returns  high  enough  to  pay  back  the  loan.  In  FGDs,  HE 
operators reported that they did not apply for credit in part because they were not confident about 
their ability to repay the loan. This finding was corroborated by the results of the FinScope 2009 
survey, which show that among the majority of HEs who have never applied for a loan (87 
percent), more than a third did not do so out of fear of not having enough money to repay the 
loan, while 17 percent said they actually did not have enough money.  Taken together, these two 
groups constitute a little more than half of all HEs who did not apply for a loan, implying that 
their underlying problem is poor cash flow.  Another 20 percent did not seek credit because of 
tough loan conditions (Table A1.16).  HEs are therefore subjected to a vicious circle. Their high 
credit risk associated with their weak business performance makes it difficult for them to access 
bank credit to grow their business.   
 
1.  Even  when  microcredit  companies  (such  as  PRIDE  or  FINCA)  and  NGOs  (such  as 
VICOBA/DUNDULIZA) manage risk by lending to groups of HEs, the interest rate they charge 
is high. This is due not only to the high unit costs of providing credit to small borrowers, but also 
to high risk of default. Some lending companies charge as high as 40 to 100 percent interest per 
year  along  with  short  repayment  periods.  Weaknesses  in  the  business  and  regulatory 
environment of the microfinance sector have constrained their effectiveness in addressing this 
0  .2  .4  .6  .8  1 
Other sources 
Bank or financial institution 
Business association, NGO, donor project 
Saving and credit co-operative (SACCO) 
Rotating saving & credit group (UPATU) 
Relative or friend 
HEs 
Male  Female 
0  .2  .4  .6  .8  1 
Other sources 
Bank or financial institution 
Business association, NGO, donor project 
Saving and credit co-operative (SACCO) 
Rotating saving & credit group (UPATU) 
Relative or friend 
Micro enterprises 
Male  Female 26 
 
gap.
15  Despite government interventions, FGD participants reported that many government -
supported credit programs have not reached them at all. 
 
51.   Anecdotal evidence from the FGD study shows that managing the loaned money is a 
daunting task for HEs owing to business risk, household risk, and fungibility problems, which 
create the potential for delayed repayment or default. In such cases, the response from some of 
these creditors can be disproportionately adverse. Some FGD participants narrated their ordeal 
when the credit-lending organization raided the house of one of the defaulters and parted with 
belongings worth more than the value of the credit. Managing a large lump sum of borrowed 
money also poses risks to borrowers and creditors alike.  As noted by participants in the FGD 
study:   
“If you give a loan of TSh 200,000 to an individual who needs only TSh 20,000 for 
capital, he/she will not be able to use it. He/she will use TSh 150,000 for other purposes 
unrelated to the business.” Male participant, Mwanza.  
“I borrowed TSh 900,000 one year ago from Akiba Commercial Bank (ACB), and one of 
the group members borrowed TSh 2,000,000. She disappeared. We are paying for her 
loan and can‟t get any new loans until we pay up her debt. I would rather do  kibati 
(merry-go-round) from the neighborhood than to be part of a group whose fate can be this 
devastating.” Youth participant, FGD, Arusha. 
 
52.  The “soft” loans provided under most microfinance programs are often viewed not to be 
so. The additional conditions attached to them, including the need for some form of collateral, or 
a business registration certificate, or reference from a group lending association, work against the 
expectation of many HEs. Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed that the youth 
are more vulnerable to this credit constraint because they are under-age to qualify for a loan. 
Compared to older traders, they are also more mobile, but with less unmovable assets, hence they 
are less trusted. This is a common predicament among the Machingas, over 95 percent of whom 
are young people (Lyons and Msoka, 2007). 
 
53.  Most NGO and government microfinance programs consider women more trustworthy 
and effective in using loaned money for intended impact.
16 Women may be constrained from 
borrowing from other sources because the assets they seek to use as collaterals are legally owned 
by men.  But these donor- or NGO-assisted projects target women not only because they lack 
                                                           
15 However, it is interesting to note that most FGD participants had some broad knowledge of loan conditionality, 
including the setting of interest rate. This was attested by their response to hypothetical test question during the 
FGD. For example, they were asked: If you were given a loan of TSh 5 million, would you accept it? If not, why? If 
yes, what would you do with it? Those whose sales turnover was much higher said they will accept it, as opposed to 
those  with  less  who  said  they  will  not.  Those  in  between  had  plans  to  expand  their  business,  mostly  to  buy 
equipment or move to another more lucrative business. These were often the ones who had applied for but were 
denied loans earlier.  
16 Some microfinance institutions, such as BRAC and PRIDE, have programs that are biased towards women. Also, 
there are specific government programs for women, for instance, the Women Development Fund (WDF) and Equal 
Opportunity Trust Fund (EOTF), but none f or men. Globally, the Microcredit Summit Campaign reports that 80 
percent of microfinance clients are women, with the proportion varying by region. The larger shares were in Asia, 
followed by Africa and Latin America (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007).  
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collateral, but also because the models used (such as group lending) are from South Asia, where 
experience showed that women were better at loan repayment.  
 
 
54.  M-PESA  could  become  a  real  game-changer  for  HEs.  The  M-PESA  (and  similar 
technologies by other mobile phone operators, such as Zain and Zantel) provides money transfer 
by short message service (SMS). More importantly, it is accessible to anyone, even to those with 
no bank account, and does not charge any fee other than the small fee for using the service. The 
system operates just like banks where financial services can be bought and sold. Local shops, 
which are mostly  HEs, deposit  cash  in  with  local  agents.   The M-PESA system  also  offers 
substitutes to savings in the form of pre-paid phone credits, which are liquid (Box 4.1). They are 
not sources of credit, however. Banks have been quick to see this as an opportunity by creating 
mobile phone accounts and linking them to their services.  
 
Box 4.1: The Vodacom's M-PESA Financial Services 
 
 
The VODAFONE M-PESA system provides financial services like a commercial bank. The customer can deposit, 
transfer, or withdraw cash with the M-PESA agent, who serves like a bank agent. The customer is required to 
complete a form with his/her personal information (name, number of cellular or mobile handset, and phone number) 
to  be  filled  in  the  M-PESA  communication  system.  After  registration,  a  registered  customer  receives  an  SMS 
indicating his/her Personal Identification Number (PIN), which is a 4-digit secret code. The PIN number is to be 
used whenever the customer wishes to access account information or perform financial-cum-banking transaction 
under the control of the M-PESA service network.  
 
The M-PESA system can provide information on account balances, transfer funds from a registered customer‟s 
account to another, and receive notification of the transaction through a message on the mobile phone. It also allows 
the customer to change his/ her PIN number. Most of the VODAFONE customers are automatically registered by 
the M-PESA communication system for financial services. Any holder of a mobile or cellular phone qualifies to be 
„a recipient end‟ to receive messages from the M-PESA network, even without being its customer. For instance, 
anybody registered with either ZANTEL, ZAIN, or TIGO can also receive VODAFONE-based messages and cash 
from an M-PESA agent, but only if adequate information from the accountholder is provided.    
 
The customer can access his account balance, using a cellular or mobile phone screen in any location where network 
is available, to make transactions. For instance, a customer with an M-PESA account can instantly buy or pay for 
goods  or  services,  which  belong  to  another  M-PESA  customer,  e.g.,  BP  (for  fuel),  TANESCO  (for  LUKU 
electricity), SHOPRITE (for goods), using their cellular handsets or mobile phones with money balances.     
 
The charges for M-PESA services are very low and affordable to low-income households (about 2 percent of the 
transacted value). The integrity of the system, however, is still an issue that calls for a regulatory oversight by the 
Bank of Tanzania to ensure the sustainability of the service, and guard against the risk of mass default.   
 
The rate of M-PESA utilization remains low despite the credit needs of a large number of households without access 
to financial services.  this may reflect limited knowledge, or since the service is new, an incomplete network of 




4.3  Business Premises and the Urban Planning Policy  
 
4.3.1  Places for Conducting Business, by Location  
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55.  Having  a  fixed  premise  for  conducting  business  is  a  prerequisite  to  being  formally 
registered or granted a business license. However, only a very small share of HEs (9 percent) is 
located in a permanent workspace other than their home (Table 4.5).  Because of lack of access 
to credit coupled with the significant growth of the informal sector, it has become very difficult 
for HEs to afford a rented premise. On average, over 35 percent of them conduct their business 
in  their  own  homes.  Others  are  forced  to  be  mobile  (e.g.,  the  Machingas).  Most  rural  HEs 
operate from home and are less mobile than urban HEs.   
 
56.  For urban HEs, however, operating from one‟s home is often not optimal, as it limits 
access to bigger markets. This strengthens their motivation for hawking, an option which runs 
them into constant fights with local authorities (as discussed in the next subsection). 
 
Table ‎ 4.5:  Place of Conducting Business Among HEs, 2006 (percent) 
 
  Rural  Secondary Urban  Dar es Salaam  Total 
Own home - with business space  19.5  16.4  16.9  18.4 
Own home - no special business space  17.2  13.8  13.5  15.8 
Structure attached to house  0.8  0.9  1.4  0.9 
Perm. building other than home  7.4  11.1  10.3  8.8 
Fixed kiosk/stall – market  5.5  10.8  9.0  7.3 
Vehicle, cart, temp stall – market  4.0  9.6  3.8  5.3 
Fixed stall – street  3.5  4.2  7.8  4.4 
Vehicle, cart, temp stall – street  1.1  3.7  6.4  2.6 
Other temporary structure  8.0  10.9  9.6  8.9 
Construction site  1.3  1.1  2.0  1.4 
Customer's/employer's house  1.1  0.6  0.8  0.9 
No fixed location / mobile  30.6  16.9  18.4  25.4 
Total  100  100  100  100 
 
        Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
 
 
4.3.2  Implications of Urban Planning Policy of LGAs 
57.  The town planning policy of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) has not been 
proactive in tapping the opportunity presented by HEs to support its job creation agenda.  With 
rapid urbanization fuelled mainly by rising rural-urban migration, the LGAs are under increasing 
pressure to allocate legitimate areas for conducting businesses.
17 Large urban areas, however, 
have limited business premises in the more economically active and lucrative urban locations, 
and the rent in these areas is usually high. In the case of Dar es Salaam, the lar gest city in 
Tanzania and the fastest growing in Africa, this has become a major challenge because the 
growth of traders has far exceeded the ability of city authorities to respond effectively. As a 
result, traders congest in populated areas for assured market.  Since they cannot afford the cost of 
renting, most end up as mobile traders.   
                                                           
17 During its Innovative Cities Global Dialogues (June 22-23, 2010), the World Bank Institute (WBI) argued that, 
although urbanization presents many challenges, it provides enormous economic opportunities for growth, poverty 
reduction, and a better quality of life. This argument is based on the fact that most wealth is created in cities, which 
account for some 70 percent of global GDP; and that no advanced country has achieved its levels of development 
without urbanizing. As shown in this report, the performance of urban HEs is significantly better than those of rural 
HEs. This shows that, if well managed, urbanization will be a key driver of productivity in HEs, with enormous 
potential for the poor to participate in economic growth, improve welfare, and fight poverty. 29 
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4.3.4  The Machinga Problem 
 
58.  In order to curb the problem of congestion of informal sector activities in towns and 
cities, the city authorities, especially in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, and Mwanza, regularly engage in 
“clean-up” operations to which the mobile traders or hawkers (the Machingas) are especially 
vulnerable. The loss of goods and potential earnings often proved costly, with adverse impact on 
HEs. It is therefore not surprising that harassment by LGAs and law enforcement officers was 
cited in the FGD study as the biggest problem of those who are engaged in hawking.  When 
asked  why  they  are  chased  by  city  authorities,  hawkers  acknowledged  that  they  are  doing 
business where the customers are.  These are often areas close to business centers or markets in 
which existing zoning laws prohibit them from operating:   
 
  “The authorities are harassing us and confiscating our assets. I have decided to open my 
business at night. I do business when the government is asleep. I earn a living for my 
family by doing this.” Urban female participant, FGD, Kilimanjaro.  
59.  Forceful eviction from the more lucrative business areas in which traders make spot sales 
presents a compelling case for the failure of LGAs to support HEs.  Even though the local 
authorities are simply enforcing the law, their operations have largely been counterproductive by 
increasing  rather  than  reducing  poverty.  Such  actions  also  serve  to  heighten  the  sense  of 
insecurity and vulnerability among HEs. This was borne out by a report popularly known as the 
“Machinga Study,” which examined this particular issue (Lyons and Msoka, 2007).
18 Over 60 
percent  of  the  622  operators  interviewed  for  the  study  considered  eviction  as  their  most 
memorable experience relative to other forms of government interventions, such as taxes, fines, 
and other forms of harassment (Table 4.6).  
Table ‎ 4.6:  Relative Importance of Eviction as Traders' Most Memorable Experience, 2007 
 
  Eviction  Other intervention*  Other experience  Total 
No direct experience  115 (49.6%)  45 (19.4%)  72 (31%)  232 (100%) 
Direct experience  113 (81.3%)  18 (12.9%)  8 (5.8%)  139 (100%) 
Total  228 (61.5%)  63 (17.0%)  80 (21.6%)  371 (100%) 
 
Note: *include fines, confiscations, prosecution, and harassment. 
 
Source: Lyons and Msoka, 2007. 
 
60.  The response of HE operators to the eviction plan has been mixed. While some abide by 
it, most make a temporary retreat, while others abandon their business altogether.  On those who 
resist eviction, a disproportionate amount of force is deployed by LGA officials to drive them 
out, with adverse consequences. As noted by the Machinga Study: 
“The impact of eviction and relocation policies has been profound and far-reaching, affecting 
vendors, their livelihoods, their dependents and anyone dependent on them for business.
19 
The evictions have involved loss of physical capital such as kiosks, loss of operating capital 
through fines and stock confiscations, loss of customers through relocations, loss of supply 
                                                           
18 Other previous studies on the impact of eviction include Liviga and Mekacha (1998) and Sisya R.M (2005). 
19 The report does not contain quantitative estimates of the losses or impact of eviction, but rather detailed narratives 
from the respondents.  31 
 
lines through increased distance to suppliers, and loss of trading time through jail sentences 
or time taken outside the business to rebuild starting capital.” 
 
In response to the problem of lack of workspace in Dar es Salaam, the LGA recently built a 
multi-story building for use by itinerant traders. Dubbed the “Machinga Complex,” the project 
was  estimated  to  cost  TSh  13  billion  (approximately  US$13  million),  but  has  not  been 
operational because of some governance issues (Box 4.2). Nonetheless, initial assessment shows 
that the intervention falls short of addressing the needs of the Machingas.  
 
Box 4.2: Will the Machinga Complex Solve the Problem of Itinerancy in Dar es Salaam? 
 
 
The “Machinga Complex” project, started in 2008 with funding from the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), is 
estimated to cost around TSh 13 billion. The complex is owned by the Dar es Salaam City Council, which borrowed 
money for the project from the NSSF. The regional administration (the Regional Commissioner and the Regional 
Administrative  Secretary)  participates  in  the  process  to  ensure  that  the  project  addresses  the  problem  of  the 
Machingas. However, building operations were delayed due to governance issues. 
 
The building was designed to provide 10,000 workspaces (compartments or stalls). However, only 6,500 rooms 
were built, prompting the government to order an investigation. Fewer rooms increased average cost, raising the 
price of rent to cover the loss and repay the NSSF loan. No parking space is provided for motorists, lowering the 
market  value  of  the  building.  That  the  building  contractor  was  alleged  to  have  been  paid  over  and  above  the 
contracted amount complicates the problem with the project. 
 
The Machinga complex is a 7-storey building. Since there is no elevator and few customers will walk all the way to 
the 7
th floor (nor do merchants want to haul their goods up that many floors either), it is likely that the uppermost 
floors may end up being used for a different purpose (e.g., for storage or office use), which run counter to the nature 
of the Machingas‟ business. Being multi-storeyed, it is also feared that potential customers might be discouraged 
from shopping in the complex and might prefer to go to more accessible shopping locations. 
.  
The main concern of the public though is whether the building will solve the Machinga problem. A rapid survey by 
a local media reveals a rising public skepticism over who will actually benefit from the project.  There are those who 
believe that the richer and larger enterprises will be the beneficiaries instead of the  Machingas. One Machinga 
interviewed by a local media was reported to have revealed that the application form for a slot in the complex is 
being sold at an expensive price of TSh 50,000, but does not guarantee that the applicant will get the slot. There is, 
however, a mixed reaction to the project. Some consider it a positive step as the complex can accommodate a large 
crowd and hence a bigger market.  Others feared that they not make the same amount of money they currently earn 
by moving into the complex. Some Machingas were quoted as saying:  
  
“It is okay.  We will have a big crowd, and that‟s where we can make more money.” 
 
“There is no sign of us going there.  It seems there are people already prepared to occupy the slots meant for us.” 
 
The most furious complained that the process for selecting operators to occupy the building is not transparent. The 
problem with the project stems to a large degree from how it was planned. When the project was designed, there was 
little consultation with the Machingas.  
 
 
61.   In other instances, LGA officials conduct inspections of HEs to check their compliance 
with license, tax, and various other regulations even though most of these requirements apply 
only  to  formal  enterprises.  HEs  have  little  knowledge  of  the  tax  code  or  registration 
requirements, and no place to complain. Many reported having paid large sums to unscrupulous 
officials or that the latter confiscated their merchandise, causing them tremendous losses and 
more hardship – an increasing the poverty and deprivation of their household members.   
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62.  What mainly deter small and unincorporated businesses, including HEs, from applying 
for a license or getting registered are the cumbersome registration and licensing procedures that 
LGAs require, which involve visits to several government departments. The licensing regime is 
due to change following the enactment of the new Business Activity Registration Act (BARA) of 
2009 that is provisionally planned to take effect from September 2010 (see Table 1.19). It is not 
clear  how  BARA  can  effectively  address  the  challenges  faced  by  small  enterprises.  More 
importantly, its provision of abolishing the itinerant trade license appears to be a lost opportunity 
to improve the Machinga situation in large urban areas. The Machinga-run enterprises will not 
disappear just because they do not qualify as a business under BARA.  
 
63.  In  addition  to  business  licensing  or  registration,  LGAs  have  also  been  administering 
public  microcredit  programs.  An  example  is  the  Youth  Empowerment  Fund,  which  was 
established  in  1993  to  provide  youth  with  small  capital  to  start  a  business.  The  central 
government provides the seed money, with contributions from the respective LGAs from their 
own revenues. Each district council is required to select two SACCOs to administer the fund. 
Many SACCOs, however, are found to be too small and suffer from weak operational capacity. 
For  example,  they  receive  more  loan  applications  than  they  can  accommodate.  Moreover, 
SACCOs have not been brought under a clear financial regulatory regime, which makes working 
with a SACCO risky for an HE operator. 
 
64.  In summary, a change in the LGAs‟ regulation of and attitude towards HEs is necessary 
to resolve major issues concerning workplaces and the legality of HEs. Regulatory changes need 
to  be  accompanied  by  efforts  at  positive  collaboration  between  the  LGAs  and  the  HEs 
themselves to find a compromise solution that facilitates rather than restricts HE operations. 
LGAs need to see HEs as a solution to their employment problems, as well as contributors and 
not temporary impediments to local economic development. 
 
4.4  Operational Challenges and Livelihood Risks 
 
65.  Boxes 4.3 to 4.7 list the many constraints HE operators grapple with in running their 
business. Apart from these difficulties, HEs, by their very nature of being a household business,  
are also vulnerable to both household as well as business risks. The most frequently cited in the 
literature, from the FGD study and from the recent FinScope survey (Table A1.17), is the risk of 
serious illness or death in the family. Faced with such shock, HEs often struggle to meet the 
immediate  cost  of  treatment  or  burial  by  borrowing  money  from  relatives  and/or  friends  or 
drawing down their limited savings (Table A1.18), thereby depleting their working capital. 
 
66.   Rural  HEs,  in  particular,  are  exposed  to  risks  that  stem  from  their  overreliance  on 
agricultural produce as a source of capital.  In bad weather, low production reduces their farm 
earnings.  In  turn,  their  operations  suffer,  resulting  in  low  turnover  and  further  reduction  in 
earnings. Even in times of favorable weather and good harvest, HEs are exposed to potential 
risks, such as instability in the market and/or prices of their products. Aggravating these risks is 
the perishability of some agricultural produce. 
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Box 4.3: Main Constraints Identified by VIBINDO,
20 2008 
 
1.  Lack of reliable and suitable location for doing business 
2.  Lack of recognition in local town planning 
3.  Lack of start-up and working capital 
4.  Lack of basic management and business development skills 
5.  Lack of laws that recognize the informal sector 
6.  Inadequate implementation of the national SME development policy 
7.  Lack of institutional framework (within specific ministry) for the promotion of the informal sector 
8.  Lack of representation in national policymaking 
9.  Humiliation and insecurity resulting from the negative attitude of city council officials 
10.  Official view of informal sector activities as illegal 
11.  High cost of legal services and court procedures  
12.  Unfavorable tax assessment, based on size of capital and not on profit 
13.  Language discrimination as most laws are written in English 
14.  Unfair market competition due to imports of low quality cheap goods 
15.  Lack of linkage with large-scale enterprises 
16.  Lack of representation and recognition in the national business council. 
 
Source: VIBINDO, 2008 
 
 
Box 4.4: Major Constraints Listed by the Sampled Enterprises in the Urban FGDs, 2009 
 
1.  Lack of capital because of high interest rates charged on loans and unfavorable repayment conditions, which 
hinders expansion of the enterprises and/or start-up of new ones  
2.  Unreliable markets/unpredictable demand 
3.  Lack of skills to organize and conduct business  
4.  Middlemen (madalali), who take home most of the  profit (e.g., this was a major problem in the Keko cluster 
of carpentry).  
5.  Inadequate machinery, equipment, and tools; lack of maintenance 
6.  Poor quality of packaging materials for enterprises engaged in food processing 
7.  Fluctuation in prices of inputs and products; sharp rise in commodity prices 
8.  Poor condition of transport/infrastructure for businesses that have to transport commodities from one region to 
another (for instance, bananas from Kagera to Mwanza region).  
9.  Payment of unrealistic taxes (based on estimates by local and central government agents) 
10.  Competition among entrepreneurs doing the same type of business over few customers 
11.  Business premises subject to demolition (bomoa-bomoa) by municipal and central government authorities; 
poor location with weak customer base 
12.  Corruption (involving tax assessment and in accessing loan from President Kikwete‟s Fund, in particular.  
13.  Lack of teamwork (not organized); lack of collaboration, for example, among enterprises doing the same kind 
of business, causing heavy competition and often tension 
14.  Seasonal businesses (e.g., food vendors get a large number of customers in construction sites only at particular 
times, etc). 
15.  Difficulties in getting commodities, for instance, timber for furniture industries  
16.  Absence of industries to process agricultural products like tomatoes 
17.  Imbalance between expenditure and earnings (low profits) 
18.  Unethical or untrustworthy employees  
19.   Perishability of products (e.g., fruits and vegetables resulting in loss of earnings).  
20.  Family members diverting money allocated to business for luxury goods.  
 
 
   
                                                           
20 VIBINDO is an organization of informal sector operators based mainly in Dar es Salaam. Its main function is 
advocacy for informal traders. 34 
 
Box 4.5: Major Constraints Listed by the Sampled Enterprises in the Rural FGDs, 2009 
 
1.  Seasonality of income from agriculture, resulting in business stagnation (especially businesses dependent 
on farmers‟ seasonal incomes). 
2.  Poor road infrastructure to the villages (hence high transport cost for goods)  
3.  Low capital which hinders expansion or start-up of businesses. 
4.  Lack of business skills; lack of training   
5.  Poor harvest (due to bad weather), high price of agricultural inputs, poor agricultural markets, poor 
market information, and lack of irrigation facilities; hence less money from agriculture to invest in 
business. 
6.  Market competition among entrepreneurs in the same village and/or entrepreneurs from other villages 
(e.g., auction markets for selling clothes attract traders from several areas, including from the nearby 
towns).  
7.  Security (risk of theft), coupled with lack of secure places to keep money (e.g., banks which are easily 
accessible) 
8.  Remote location of some business enterprises 
9.  No saving culture  
10.  Selling by credit with possible risk of default by borrower 
11.  High income tax charged by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 
 
4.5  Coping Strategies  
 
67.  While much of the studies conducted so far have generated a wealth of information about 
the many constraints faced by HEs, little is known about how they cope with these difficulties. 
Narratives from the FGD participants shed light on some of the coping strategies HEs adopt to 
overcome these constraints or mitigate their effects.  Some of these findings are corroborated by 
the results of the recent FinScope survey (Table A1.18). 
 
68.  Most HEs survive from a variety of risks and constraints with resilience, hard work, and 
good use of a network of family and community support. Some draw on their limited household 
savings and switch between working on farm and running their HEs to augment low income.  
Others sell on credit, which is made possible by previous business relationships. Urban HEs cope 
with the risk of theft and burglary by making their own security arrangements. For example, HE 
operators sharing a business premise with other operators make a monthly contribution to pay for 
hired security guards. In the rural areas, it is common to find a group of HEs guarding their 
property on a rotation basis.  
 
69.  Although most HEs adopt coping strategies that are useful in mitigating risks, others 
resort to deceptive, sometimes illegal practices. For example, some operators admitted during 
interviews to charging wealthier-looking customers higher than the regular price for services 
rendered (e.g., TSh 500 instead of TSh 200 for shoe-shining), or tampering with their weighing 
machines such that customers pay more for lesser amount of the goods they buy.  Hawkers 
reported to have paid bribes to be able to operate in restricted areas. In some extreme cases, HE 
owners resorted to operating at night to avoid harassment by local officials.  
 
70.  Support  from  relatives  and  friends  is  very  useful  for  HEs,  especially  as  a  source  of 
capital. Since access to credit from MFIs is found to be biased in favor of urban areas, the only 
option for HEs in the rural areas is to rely on the generosity of relatives and friends, or to draw 35 
 
down their savings, when available (Table A1.18). As mentioned above, SACCOs are reported 
to be the second best alternative for businesses to access credit, but their level of service is 
limited (only 15 percent of HEs use SACCOs; see Table 4.4 above). Assistance received from 
donor and NGO projects are limited to Dar es Salaam (30 percent of HEs), compared to only 10 
percent in the rural areas. HEs also make extensive use of family workers (paid or unpaid) to 
avoid paying wages, and also as a source of trustworthy labor.  
 
2.  Most HEs are vulnerable to risks associated with sudden family or social events (e.g., 
illness or death in the family, weddings, etc.). To mitigate such risks, they invest a considerable 
amount of effort, time, and resources in group networks (clan, community, ethnic, etc.), or join 
self-help or welfare associations.
21  Such networks offer some sort of group insurance to lessen 
the burden of members in times of need. Self-help networks have also become a useful channel 
for group lending, especially under various NGO - and/or donor-assisted microfinance projects 
that  aim  to  reduce  the  potential  r isk  of  default  by  beneficiaries.  Other  associations,  like 
VIBINDO, play the role of advocacy to demand supportive action from authorities to address 
their problems, or build solidarity among affected groups to protest against unfavorable policies.  
 
4.6  Perception of Factors for Business Growth and Failure  
 
71.  Although predominantly engaged in relatively low-earning activities, HEs have a good 
sense of the many factors that underpin a successful business, as well as those that lead to failure. 
Table 4.7 lists some of the indicators for business success, as well as failure, most often cited 
during the FGDs.  A successful business to many means: (a) one  with a capital that grows over 
time; (b) one that earns substantial profit; (c) one that attracts more customers over time; and (d) 
one that generates enough cash for consumption and acquisition of more assets (including a 
house and private education for  the HE operators‟ children).  
 
Table ‎ 4.7:  HEs' Perceptions of Factors for Business Growth and Failure 
 
Factors for Business Growth  Factors for Business Failure 
  Economical use of income from business whereby 
expenditures are less than earnings; 
  Increased  capital  which  enables  firms  to  procure 
larger consignments of goods at a time; 
  High  demand  for  goods  produced  and  services 
provided; 
  Good business management; and 
  Good sales of agricultural produce, which generate 
income to boost capital 
 Theft of traded goods by untrustworthy employees; 
 Incurring  loss,  such  as  losing  goods  or  cash  in  an 
accident
22 
 Spending more than what one earns from the business; 
 Seasonality  of  businesses  done,  for  instance, 
agribusiness depends on rainfall;  
 Poor roads, which lead to high transport cost 
 Perishable goods that are not sold out, such as fruits 
and vegetables 
                                                           
21Wenga et al. (1995) observed that self-help organizations in the informal sector are critical to the success of HEs, 
but are incapable of participating effectively in dialogue with the government to defend their members‟ interests. 
The study estimated that in 1995, there were 300 self-help organizations in Dar (current estimate is more than twice 
that number).  
 




Source: FGD report, 2009 
72.  Narratives collected from FGDs provide further insights into what HE operators perceive 
as the main contributing factors for their success or failure in business (Appendix B).   The 
entrepreneur from Arusha cited the experience he had accumulated over the years in running his 
HE and his good cash management skills as the reasons why his business is doing well. He took 
his first loan to expand his business, and a second loan to have a secure workspace where he 
could grow it further.  His HE enabled him to build up his assets.  His is a success story.   
 
73.  Similarly, the woman entrepreneur from Mtwara used her savings to start her business of 
trading cashew nuts.  She joined an association of small entrepreneurs and made full use of her 
membership  to  avail  of  loans,  entrepreneurship  training,  and  important  business  and  market 
information.  She attributed her success to her constantly seeking and seizing every opportunity 
to improve her trading enterprise and hone her business skills.   
 
74.  The food vendor from Mtwara, however, shows the risks and vulnerability of HEs which 
operate in difficult, often unfavorable conditions.  She started her food-vending business with a 
small capital from her husband, but suffered an initial loss because of the seasonality of demand 
for her goods and the demolition of her banda (shed) by thieves.  To rebuild, she moved to 
another rented premise, but her business hardly recovered: “The business was not paying! Unlike 
in the early days, a big chunk of the cooked food remained unsold and I had to take it home or 
give it to neighbors.” As a fallback and to reduce the cost of running her business, she left her 
rented  workplace  and  started  to  operate  from  home  where  her  HE  continued  to  struggle  to 
survive.  
 
75.  The story of the entrepreneur from Mwanza started out as a success, but ended in failure.  
He began as a trader in rice, and later opened his own place to sell rice, which proved profitable.  
Having earned enough capital, he diversified into another more high-risk business, a butchery, 
which was equally lucrative in the beginning and which helped him build his assets.  However, 
the butchery did not stay profitable for long.  He eventually suffered a loss because of lack of 
demand for his meat products, and was not able to recover: “I could not sell all the meat. For 
example, when I slaughtered a cow worth TSh 100,000, I could sell about Tsh 70,000 worth on 
the first day. When meat remains unsold, one has to sell at a lower price the following day. I was 
losing my capital.” 
 
76.  The  above  narratives  show  the  potentials  of  household  enterprises  as  a  source  of 
livelihood  and  a  pathway  out  of  poverty,  but  they  also  reveal  some  of  the  risks  and 
vulnerabilities of small HE operators that lock them in it.    37 
 
5  Policies, Programs, and Institutions Affecting the HE Sector  
 
77.  A review of policies, programs, projects, and institutions that affect the HE sector shows 
that the government has no specific policy and institutional framework for promoting this sector. 
Instead,  the  various  policy  statements  that  purport  to  promote  the  informal  sector  are  not 
matched by the government‟s actions on the ground. Although there are a number of programs 
and projects that seek to address some of the key constraints faced by HEs, they suffer from lack 
of coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and ineffective targeting, all of which limit their 
impact  as  well  as  potential  for  scaling  up.    More  importantly,  they  fail  because  they  are 
conceived without adequate knowledge of the problems of the HE sector, and without direct 
input from HEs. 
 
5.1  Policies and Institutions on the Informal Sector 
 
78.  Despite a notable recognition of the HEs as an integral part of the informal sector,
23 and 
of  its  importance  in  job  creatio n  and  poverty  reduction,  Tanzania  has  no  specific  policy 
framework for promoting the HE sector. Even when policy intentions exist, there is no single 
institution responsible for coordinating the various initiatives aimed at promoting the informal 
sector in general and the HE sector in particular. The government‟s objectives remain too broad 
and its interventions mostly piecemeal to effectively address the specific needs of HEs. In some 
cases (e.g., the MKURABITA program), policy interventions differ from the priority needs of 
HEs.  
 
79.   Although many factors contribute to this indifference, this subsection focuses on two 
important  policy  issues:  the  policy  dilemma  faced  by  the  government  in  dealing  with  the 
informal sector, and the failure of coordination among concerned agencies tasked with programs 
directed to the sector.  
5.1.1  Policy Dilemma  
 
80.  One explanation for the lack of an institutional  environment  favorable  to  HEs is  the 
policy dilemma faced by the government on whether to promote it on the basis of its positive 
role in the economy, or to thwart it on the basis of its illegitimacy (Bangasser, 1996).  Some 
policy documents (inter alia, the SME Policy of 2003 and the Employment Policy of 2008) 
contain specific statements in support of the sector, but adverse practices on the ground (e.g., 
forceful eviction of hawkers) negate them.  
 
                                                           
23 One might plausibly argue that informal sector is inclusive of HEs, but as indicated earlier, within the informal 
sector, wide variations between categories of businesses and types of employment are observed. Thus, many suggest 
a blanket focus on “formalizing” the informal sector, but what they really mean is enforcing the labor regulations on 
firms which hire employees. while this policy focus may be justified, it has nothing to do with HEs who do not hire 
labor. Thus, policies should take into account such differences, and design appropriate interventions specifically for 
the HE sector. 
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81.  Recognizing the faster growth and increasingly important role of the informal sector in 
the  economy,  the  national  employment  policy  (2008)  focuses  on  its  formalization  (through 
licenses, VAT, and business registration) as though it was a panacea to addressing the problem 
of low productivity in the sector. The policy aims “to transform the informal sector so that it 
provides decent employment and increased productivity” and “to empower the informal sector to 
become formal in order to be able to access finance, training or any other BDS.”  However, the 
policy also cautions that the informal sector is not in conformity with regulations, thus it is 
limiting its potential to create more jobs and increase its productivity. Further, the policy states 
that its aim is “to empower the informal sector to become formal in order for them to access 
finance, training, or any other business development service.” 
 
82.  These  policy  statements  raise  several  questions.  First,  how  would  conformity  with 
regulations help a sector that is almost regulated out of business? Second, is this approach in line 
with HEs own aspiration to not be transformed into a large employer, but rather to survive and 
bring sufficient cash income into the household? This “formalization” approach has not been 
useful, since neither the different programs supporting the sector nor the drive to formalize it has 
had  significant  tangible  impact.  Instead,  the  sector  continues  to  grow  amidst  weak  policy 
environment. Given their nano size, formalizing HEs can be too costly and is generally less 
useful  in  improving their productivity. Moreover, it is important to  note that in the specific 
context of HEs, formalization is not a priority objective. This disconnect between the policy 
framework and the sector has further limited the needed government support for HEs. 
5.1.2  Coordination Failure 
83.  Reflecting its crosscutting nature, there exists a wide range of policies influencing the 
informal  sector,  with  accompanying  programs  and  projects  being  executed  by  various 
government  agencies  at  the  national  and  sector  level  (Table  5.1).  Not  surprisingly,  the 
implementation of such policies raises significant coordination challenge, since there is no single 
institution solely responsible for the promotion and development of the informal sector.   
 
84.  One  of  the  main  efforts  by  the  government  aimed  at  promoting  the  informal  sector, 
including the HEs, is the MKURABITA program.  The program was established in 2007 to 
support the formalization of informal activities, focusing mainly on land registry and titling to 
increase the value of assets in the sector. To improve program implementation, a number of 
baseline studies were conducted. The results of these and other related studies, however, reveal 
that the needs of the informal sector are different from those identified by the program (Lyons 
and Msoka, 2007; VIBINDO, 2008). Moreover, the program is found to have little, if any effect 
in addressing the main constraints facing the HE sector. This comes as no surprise as the target 
beneficiaries from the informal sector know little or nothing about the program. A major finding 
of the VIBINDO study, for example, shows that over 96 percent of informal sector enterprise 
operators never heard of MKURABITA (VIBINDO, 2008). Based on this finding and the results 
of other related studies, various stakeholders recommend the need for rethinking the scope and 
implementation of the program. 
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Table ‎ 5.1:  Institutions and Policies on the Informal Sector with Overlapping Mandates 
 
S.n. Implementing 
Institution or Agency  
Policy   Associated 
Agency/Program 
Relevant Issue for 
the HE Sector  
Key 
Observation/Comment 
1  Ministry of Industry, 
Trade and Marketing 
The SMEs 
Development Policy  
  BRELA
24 
  SIDO 
Licensing  and 
regulation, and 
support to SMEs 
Focus mainly on 
formalization of SMEs, 
less on HEs 
2  Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs 
The National 
Microfinance Policy 
  Bank of Tanzania 
  Cooperative Soc. 
Access to credit  Weak regulation of the 
microfinance sector  
3  Ministry of Labor, 
Employment and 
Youth Development 
  The Employment 
Policy 
  Youth 
Development 
Policy 
  Tanzania 
Employment 
Services Agency 
  Directorate of 
Youth 
Development 
  Program for 
elimination of 
Child labor 
  Youth 
unemployment  
  Job creation  
  Elimination of 
Child Labor 
Primarily focused on the 
segment of the economy 
where the employment 
relationship is between 
two unrelated 
individuals.  Not focused 
on the top non-farm  
economic activity, the 
HE. 
4  President‟s Office - 
Planning Commission 
National Economic 
Empowerment Policy  
MKURABITA  Formalization  Need to enhance 
relevance to HEs 
5  Ministry of Gender, 
Women and Children 
  Child Development 
Policy 





  Focal Education 
and Training 
Program  
  Community-based 
development 
program 
  Women 
Development Fund 




based initiatives  
  Access to soft 
loans and credit 
  Establishment of 
Tanzania Women 
Bank 
Support is biased 
towards women and 
children  
6  Ministry of 








Access to credit 
through the SACCOs 
model   
Not an effective 
advocate or regulator of 
SACCOs.  
f  Ministry of Energy  The new Mineral  Development of  Artisanal miners   
                                                           
 
25 This amount applies to businesses with a yearly turnover not exceeding Tsh 20 million.  For those with a turnover 
of more than Tsh 20,000, the fine is between Tsh 200,000 and Tsh 500,000. 40 
 
and Minerals  Policy and Act   artisanal miners 
8  Prime Minister‟s 




  Town Planning 
Policy 
  BARA Act 








licensing  and 
regulation of HE 
activities 
The problem of the 
Machingas still needs to 
be resolved;  Capacity of 
LGA to implement 
BARA Act is unclear 
9  Ministry of Education 
and Vocational 
Training 
  Education Policy 
  PEDP and SEDP 
  Vocational 
Education and 





and technical training 
(trade test and 
apprenticeship) for 
the informal sector 
Training for the informal 




10  Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
  NGO/CSO/CBO 
Policy and 
Regulation 
  Safety and crime 
prevention 
  RITA  
  Police force 
 





  Crime and theft 
Crime and theft remains 





85.  Despite  its  ambitious  nature,  the  program  also  faces  a  critical  shortage  of  resources, 
which limit the scope and effectiveness of its operations. The first phase was supported by a 
government  budget  of  about  US$7  million.  Of  this  amount,  US$4  million  was  from  the 
Norwegian  government,  but  this  donor  funding  ended  in  2008.    Since  then,  funding  relied 
entirely on the government, which aims to double it from US$3 million to US$6 million in the 
2010/11 budget. 
 
5.2  Licensing and the Regulatory Regime 
 
5.2.1  Laws and Regulations 
86.  The licensing regime is regulated by the Business Licensing Act (Cap 208) of 1972. The 
Act is administered by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Marketing (MITM) and LGAs 
(councils, district, towns, municipalities, and cities), which is under the Prime Minister‟s Office 
(PMO). Business licenses are categorized and issued according to the size and nature of the 
business. While the MITM administers and collect fees, and issues Class “A” licenses, the LGAs 
issue class “B” licenses. The class A category refers to business licenses administered by policies 
and regulations on businesses of national and international nature. The Class “B” licenses are 




87.  All the business licenses are not renewable except those administered by specific pieces 
of  regulation  or  regulatory  body.    Examples  of  renewable  business  licenses  under  Class  B 
include the Intoxicating Liquor License No. 28 of 1968, which is administered by the PMO-
Regional Administration and LGAs, and the hotel and restaurants licenses administered by the 
Tourism Act No. 11 of 2008. These authorities issue business licenses biannually, i.e., the first 
licensing period is between April and September and the second, between October and March 
each year. The fees differ between urban and rural areas. For businesses in urban areas dealing 
with manufactured beers and other alcoholic drinks, the license fee is TSh 40,000; for rural areas, 
the fee is TSh 30,000 for a six-month period. Those businesses dealing with local brew in both 
urban and rural areas pay a six-monthly fee of TSh 12,000. Hotels and restaurants, on the other 
hand, are required to pay an annual license fee of TSh 20,000.    
 
88.  In addition, small businesses by individuals and traders in local markets are administered 
by some bylaws under the Treasury Department of the Councils of LGAs.  Payment receipts (not 
business licenses) are issued to these businesses upon payment of local market levies, ranging 
between TSh 200 and TSh 300 per operator per day and TSh 3000 per cattle head in abattoirs or 
auctions.  The  collected  revenues  are  deposited  to  the  general  fund  under  the  control  of  the 
Treasurer  and  the  Councils‟  Executive  Director,  part  of    which  are  used    for  cleaning  and 
maintenance, security, and infrastructure services in the marketplace. 
 
89.  It is important to note that the process of obtaining a license is long and complex. For 
instance, the Business Licensing Act Cap 208 requires all businesses to get approval to operate 
from village or ward executive officers, and a tax identification number (TIN) from the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) before obtaining any business license.  
5.2.2  Existing Challenges and the New Licensing Regime 
 
90.  Table A1.19 provides an overview of the major changes in the licensing regime with the 
passing of the new BARA Act of 2009. Despite these changes, some key challenges persist. 
These are outlined below. 
 
91.  Business Premises: Since business activities are required by the Business Licensing Act 
to operate in fixed locations, only a small proportion of HEs will be covered by the law. As noted 
earlier, only 9 percent of them operate in fixed premises.  Therefore, over 80 percent of HEs are 
not eligible to obtain a business license.  
 
92.  Multiplicity of Business Permits and Licenses: Since 2004, reforms on business licensing 
have ushered in changes that have reduced red tape (UN, 2004). These reforms are reinforced by 
the new BARA Act of 2009. The implementation of the BARA Act requires that all business 
activities be registered at the LGA or Council levels before being issued a license, that is, even if 
a business is already registered with BRELA, it has to be re-registered under BARA. In addition, 
any business entity moving from one location to another are required to re-register with the 
council controlling the local area where it will operate.  Given the multiple documents required 
by  registrars  of  business  activities  at  the  LGA  level,  registration  under  BARA,  company 
registration under BRELA, or licenses to be obtained from MITM, in addition to sector-specific 
permits, the problem of red tape persists.  Professionals, such as engineers, medical doctors, 42 
 
lawyers, and tourism specialists, for example,  have to have a professional permit or certificate 
before  they  can  practice  their  respective  profession,  and  in  addition  a  professional  business 
license if they open their own professional business (e.g.,  private hospital, an advocate‟s office, 
as tour operators, etc.). The time spent in obtaining permits, and the many agencies to be visited, 
give  rise  to  many  opportunities  for  corrupt  practices.  The  rationalization  of  the  regulatory 
framework is further compromised by the different categories of licenses required under the old 
regime, while the different roles by various actors in the current licensing process pose a new set 
of challenges in implementing the reforms. 
 
93.   Weak  relationship  between  the  Tanzania  Revenue  Authority  (TRA)  and  the  business 
licensing authorities. A case in point is the inability of Trade Officers to issue a business license 
to a business person without a TIN. The TRA is not concerned whether or not the particular 
business is licensed as long as it has a TIN, which is issued upon payment of a presumptive tax. 
As  a  consequence,  some  businesses  opt  to  pay  tax  without  complying  with  the  licensing 
requirements. Under the new regulatory regime, it is not clear what the new role of the trade 
officers is in dealing with this issue. 
 
94.  Payment  of  presumptive  income  tax:  As  mentioned  above,  the  TRA  requires  small 
businesses to pay an income tax of at least TSh 35,000 each month in advance (even before they 
start operation) before issuing them a TIN.  This tax is considered regressive because it is levied 
regardless of whether or not the business operator actually earns an income, and also because 
some larger enterprises pay an income tax equal to that imposed on small enterprises.  While the 
TIN is granted free of charge, the TRA requires proof of nationality and location from village 
and ward executive officers before issuing it. The process of certification is therefore long and 
costly, and can be more so for businesses that operate in more than one locality or region. 
 
95.  The value of registration certificate versus business license: The legal standing of a the 
registration  certificate  offered  under  BARA  is  perceived  to  be  much  lower  than  a  business 
license in facilitating business operations. The certificate merely identifies from the registry the 
person  conducting  the  business,  but  a  license  grants  recognition  to  the  particular  business 
activity.  It is noted that: 
 
“with  a  license,  your  business  can  easily  be  recognized  by  other  business  including 
foreign trade partners, but this may not be the case with registration certificate.” Male 
FGD participant, Arusha 
 
96.  Tax evasion: Informal consultations with municipal trade officers in Dar es Salaam reveal 
that many of them expressed doubt that the abolition of license fees is enough of a motivating 
factor  for  enterprises  to  register  their  business.  With  the  new  regime,  however,  a  business 
operator can register under different names in the same or different locations every after three 
months, without paying any tax upfront since an advance payment certificate is not required, 
only a TIN is required.    
 
97.  The itinerant trade license. Under the old regime, the itinerant trade license effectively 
covered the Machinga HEs, but it is not clear if this coverage holds under the new regime. In 
practice, the licensing officers regulated the Machinga HEs by granting a license, allowing a 43 
 
particular trader to  operate in  a designated locality.  As  a consequence, the  Machingas were 
encouraged to organize themselves for self-policing against new traders without a proper license. 
How effective the itinerant trade licensing is in regulating Machinga HEs, however, is not clear. 
 
98.  Enforcement: Under the new BARA Act, businesses found doing business illegally are 
fined between Tsh 50,000 and Tsh 100,000,
25 a steep penalty rate to which HEs are likely to be 
subjected. BARA also effectively excludes about 90 percent of HEs as part of its simplification 
process. This begs the question: How will HEs exempt from BARA‟s provisions (because they 
have no fixed premises) know that LGAs have no authority to penalize them over their lack of a 
registration  certificate?  There  is  no  explicit  campaign  to  inform  HEs  not  required  to  get  a 
certificate of their rights as a business entity. 
 
99.  Considering  the  above  challenges  with  the  new  national  regulation,  it  is  tempting  to 
suggest that the problem of formalizing the HE sector can be resolved by focusing on regulations 
(i.e., registration, licensing, and taxation) by local governments. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that such an approach is not necessarily a panacea and requires a much more in-depth 
analysis of the costs and benefits of formalizing HEs.  The experience of HEs in Uganda sheds 
light on the complex issues involved and how the system of licensing and taxing HEs can be 
easily abused by local authorities (Box 5.1).   
  

























                                                           
25 This amount applies to businesses with a yearly turnover not exceeding Tsh 20 million.  For those with a turnover 
of more than Tsh 20,000, the fine is between Tsh 200,000 and Tsh 500,000. 
 
Under Uganda‟s decentralization program, the registration, licensing, and taxation of larger businesses is the 
responsibility of the national government, while regulation for small businesses rests with local governments, 
which are also responsible for providing services such as police protection, market places, etc. Businesses with a 
monthly income below USh 500,000 or an annual income of USh 5 million (about USD 250 and USD 2200, 
respectively) are considered small, and these are exempt from the national business tax and national registration.   
 
Placing  the  responsibility  for  registration  and  taxation  with  LGAs  has  not  simplified  the  process  for  small 
businesses. Applications for registration and for obtaining a trading license are two separate steps that require 
multiple visits to various offices.  Businesses also have to pay user fees upfront (e.g., to use market facilities), as 
well as various other types of local government fees (“operating permits”), which differ by location.  Because of 
the high transaction cost involved, more than half of household enterprises opted not to register, but obtained a 
trade license and/or paid some other local fees in one form or another.   
 
Compounding the problem of multiple tax payments faced by HEs is the large variation in the number and 
amount of fees paid by them.  For example, within the same sector or turnover category, some HEs ended up 
paying a higher amount than others simply because they paid more types of fees.  Moreover, HEs in the high 
turnover category were more likely to report paying two or more fees than HEs in lower turnover categories. This 
suggests that  high turnover  HEs  were  targeted  for  multiple fee collection though they  were not necessarily 
engaged in more activities.  Not only does this practice discourage HEs from diversifying their activities or 
growing their enterprise; it undermines their viability.  
 
Most important, the taxation of HEs by local governments is extremely regressive.  The average fee paid by them 
was USh 83,400 per year. On the basis of their median income this amounted to a tax rate of 30-50 percent, while 
the national tax rate for large businesses is only 3.2 percent. Close to a third paid more than one type of fees, 
which indicates that HEs were taxed multiple times. Since the fees are fixed amounts, the poorest HEs pay the 
most. Fees and taxes on HEs went up dramatically after the abolition  of the other main source of tax revenue for 
LGAS -- the individual tax (graduated tax) – following the elections.  
 
The lack of standardization and transparency in the setting and collection of fees paid by HEs presented many 
opportunities for corruption and abuse of authority by local government officials.  Even if the overwhelming 
majority chose to remain in the informal sector by not registering, the case of Uganda demonstrates that HEs face 
the burden of paying a large share of local taxes in order for them to start and continue to operate their business.   
 














5.3  Existing Support Programs and Projects  
 
100.  With  very  limited  available  information,  a  comprehensive  list  and  description  of 
programs  and  projects  targeted  at  the  informal  sector,  including  HEs,  could  not  be  drawn. 
Nevertheless, the stocktaking undertaken for this report reveals useful information on a number 
of  programs  and  projects  by  various  agencies,  both  government  and  nongovernment.  Table 
A1.20 shows a list of programs and projects on which information was available, albeit with 
several gaps that limit an assessment of their impact.
26 Consequently, this study relies on useful 
insights gained from the FGD study to highlight key issues in general, while providing a detailed 
assessment of some of the programs and projects, whenever possible. 
 
101.  Most  of  the  programs  for  HEs  and  MSMEs  have  overlapping  objectives  and  target 
beneficiaries, reflecting weak coordination among implementing authorities. A large number of 
them focus on issues that involve access to credit, training on entrepreneurship skills, and socio-
economic empowerment of women and youth.  A few others are much broader in scope and seek 
to  address  larger  issues  related  to  the  business  environment.  Such  programs  include  the 
MKURABITA  (the  formalization  of  properties  owned  by  HEs),  BARA  (simplification  of 
registration and licensing), and BEST (simplification and rationalization of regulations affecting 
businesses).  The study of Johanson and Wanga (2009) on informal sector training discussed the 
limitations of the impact of SIDO and UDEC in entrepreneurship development, and VETA on 
vocational training and technical education. Another recent study analyzed the effects of both 
training and microfinance on small enterprises (Box 5.2). 
 






                                                           
26 The lack of information with which to measure impact or a complete lack of the monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) aspects of these programs is a sign of weak accountability.  
In order to understand the needs of MSEs, an experimental study was conducted in Dar es Salaam in 2008-2009, 
which involved randomly selected male and female entrepreneurs who sought loans from PRIDE, the biggest 
microfinance institution in Tanzania. The members, all of whom had already had one successful loan from 
PRIDE, were divided randomly into two groups: one was given training in book-keeping, investment, and 
marketing; the other was not trained.  Later, a sub-set of members from both groups were given business grants. 
The objective was to determine the effects of training and microfinance on the business performance of small 
entrepreneurs.   
  
Results show that microfinance alone did not have any effect on the business performance of the small 
entrepreneurs.  However, a combination of microfinance and training resulted in an increase in business 
sales and profits, particularly among male entrepreneurs. Training also improved the business knowledge of 
both female and male entrepreneurs and caused a positive change in how the organized their finances – 
including separating the business accounts from the household accounts, and in their mindset in terms of their 
self-confidence and attitude towards risk. However, the finding that these effects were greater for male 
entrepreneurs than for female entrepreneurs suggests that females faced other obstacles which affected their 
adaptation of new business practices conducive to business growth.  Supporting women to overcome these 
obstacles requires more efforts.    
      








102.  While no adequate information is available to explain the scope and location choice of 
different projects, their limited coverage affects their impact. There is also a serious lack of basic 
information on which to evaluate or monitor the effectiveness of many informal sector-related 
programs.  Most programs either do not have an M&E component, or they do not implement it 
even  if  they  have.  Missing  information  includes,  for  instance,  the  programs‟  timeframe,  the 
number  and  type  of  target  beneficiaries,  financial  resources  and  allocation,  the  cost  per 
beneficiary, and key target outcomes and associated quantitative indicators. This gap precludes 
drawing of important lessons to be learnt, as well as determining with confidence the impact of 
these programs and the feasibility for scaling-up. 
 
103.  Although some programs have a clear focus on HEs, their outcomes on the ground are 
less evident. However, it is also true that the needs on the ground are far bigger than a reasonable 
program can accommodate. What is most revealing is the widespread notion that if a government 
program provides credit, the money is believed to be a grant or is some sort of a patronage. This 
serves as a disincentive to responsible borrowing and actual repayment. 
 
104.  The Presidential Trust Fund (PTF), better known as the JK Billions, is a case in point. 
The fund is countrywide, where each region was allocated TSh one billion administered by the 
CRDB bank via the network of SACCOs. Established in 2006, its objective is to make credit 
available for poor households that do not have access to the formal credit market, and to support 
income-generating activities to improve their livelihood. While it appears to be a perfect example 
of the type of intervention that the HE sector needs, as well as a good indicator of the political 
will to address their problems, the effectiveness of the fund is far less noticeable. An assessment 
of the fund‟s impact is yet to be done, but anecdotal evidence suggests that its benefits have not 
reached its intended beneficiaries as much they have the local officials.  
 
Box 5 3: Recent Media Report on the Massive Default Rate of the PEF (JK Billions) 
 
 The Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) in Mwanza are yet to repay a total of TSh 200 million 
loan, issued by the government through its citizens‟ economic empowerment initiative. The loans, popularly known 
as the „JK Billions,‟ was in its second phase.  The 12 Mwanza-based SACCOS in Misungwi and Kwimba districts 
received a total of TSh 227 million, but only TSh15 million has been repaid. The loans, which were disbursed in 
September during the 2009/2010 financial year, were supposed to have been repaid within six months. 
 
The officials of SCCULT attributed the difficulties in repaying the loans to the “dole” mindset of the people. “There 
are people who believe that the loans were just grants, while others are treating the project as a political issue, 
believing that the money is given by the ruling party (CCM) so as to continue garnering support from them,” said 
the officer, adding that there were others who had invested in agriculture and were waiting for the harvesting season. 
According to him, in the 2009/2010 financial year, SCCULT has failed to issue loans worth TSh283 million to 
various SACCOS as they did not qualify for these loans. 
 
Source:Media report by Jane Kajoki, Mwanza, Monday, 05 July 2010. 46 
 
 
5.4  Informal Sector Training (IST) for HEs 
 
105.  It  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  view  of  informal  sector  training  (IST)  in 
Tanzania  because  of  the  fragmentation  and  dispersal  of  its  coverage.  Government  policies 
recognize the importance of IST, but these policy pronouncements have not been translated into 
concrete  programs  or  investments.  Moreover,  no  single  agency  has  the  responsibility  for 
collecting  information  about  IST  programs.  The  only  evaluation  identified  was  an  early 
assessment of the ITEP pilot training program conducted by VETA/GTZ. This evaluation did not 
systematically determine the costs and benefits of the program, and was conducted too early to 
ascertain labor market outcomes and impact on income. This section relies on a review done by 
Johanson and Wanga (2009). 
 
106.  Demand-driven traditional apprenticeship is the most common form of IST, but it is not 
well  organized  in  Tanzania,  compared  to  those  offered  in  other  countries  in  the  region, 
particularly in Kenya, Zimbabwe, or West Africa. Traditional apprenticeship has weaknesses – it 
is generally regarded as static and does not keep up with advancement in technology, although 
instances were found of innovation in the content of apprenticeship, particularly in areas where 
technology  is  changing  fast  (e.g.,  in  vehicle  maintenance).  Apprenticeship  training  in  the 
informal sector, however, has been effective in imparting trade skills to thousands of mostly 
male youth, but less to female workers. Figure 5.1 shows the result of a 10-year old survey of 
apprenticeships in Dar es Salaam, which found that only about one in four apprentices were 
female, half of whom were trained in  tailoring,  catering, childcare, and hairdressing (Nell and 
Shapiro, 1999). In the 2006 ILFS, 8 percent of women, compared to 16 percent of men, reported 
having participated in apprenticeship training programs. In general, apprenticeship training was 
found to perpetuate traditional gender-based occupational segregation.   
 
Figure 5.1:  Distribution of Apprentices in Dar es Salaam, by Field (percent) 
 
     
Note: Dark bars are mainly male; white bars are mainly female; striped bar is both male and female. 
        Source: Johanson and Wanga, 2009, based on Nell and Shapiro, 1999. 
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107.  Few public institutions in Tanzania offer training for HEs. IST training is part of the core 
mandate of VETA, but the latter‟s own corporate plan has little to say about HE training.  VETA 
also does not distinguish between training for wage-earners and for entrepreneurs, but its funding 
base (payroll taxes) favors wage-earners.  Its trainees are mostly wage earners from both the 
informal  and  formal  sectors,  including  the  government.  Moreover,  a  cursory  review  of 
information from VETA shows that demand for their programs far exceed their existing training 
capacity.  
 
108.  Among the limited number of training providers in Tanzania, nongovernment training 
institutions from the private, FBO, and NGO sectors produced about three-fourths of the total 
vocational graduates in 2007, compared to only one-fourth trained by public institutions funded 
by the central government, local governments, and VETA (Figure 5.2). Other training providers 
are business services and credit providers, including SIDO and SIDO-VETA, and other business 
development agencies such as the Tanzania Gatsby Trust (TGT).  
 
109.  There has been no rigorous evaluation of these programs to show their impact on the 
prospects  for  employment  and  income  generation  of  trainees.  Apprentices  and  trainees  of 
government programs are expected to contribute to production as soon as possible, often after 
one to  six months.  However, no records are kept  on trainee progress.  Most trainees  do not 
receive  certification  upon  completion  of  training,  except  those  trained  in  VETA  or  other 
similarly bigger and more formal training institutions (see Box 5.3 for an example of a successful 
women‟s training supported by VETA). Box 5.4 describes a government program to build skills 
in the rural areas, but one that suffers from weaknesses in quality and results monitoring.
  27  
Another  training  program  showing  promise  for  HEs  include  the  CSSC  program,  which  has 
heightened awareness of the importance of training for jobs in the informal sector based on local 
market assessments. 
Figure 5.2:  Total Vocational Graduates, by Institutional Ownership 
 
 
  Source: Calculations based on Johanson and Wangu, 2009. 
                                                           
27 The UDEC program, one of the training programs on entrepreneurship in the University of Dar Business School, 
has addressed the problem by customizing the training program to fit the business needs of specific entrepreneurs.  
This program is not targeted towards HEs, and needs to be rigorously evaluated. 

































110.  Training staff (including master craftsmen offering apprenticeships) involved in informal 
sector training tend to lack basic business skills themselves in such areas as record-keeping, 
marketing, and pricing of goods and services. This limits the productivity of graduates. On the 
other hand, in spite of their multiple training needs, most informal sector operators are unwilling 
to  invest  in  training, and have to  be convinced before participating. The low willingness  to 
participate  is  most  likely  explained  by  the  HEs‟  perception  of  opportunity  costs.  In  FGD 
discussions, HE noted the difficulty in taking time away from their business.   
 
Box 5 4: Training of HE and MSE Women in Food Preparation  
 
 
In 2001, a project under the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan helped organize and train women engaged in food 
preparation in the livestock trading area of Pugu Mnadani near Dar es Salaam. With ILO support, an NGO, the 
Gender Education Management Association (GEMA), formed an association of 60 women food vendors. GEMA 
collaborated with VETA to train them in food preparation, cooking, and hygiene for two months, and bread baking 
with SIDO for two weeks. As a result, the members were able to dramatically increase their sales of prepared food 
to livestock traders in the locality, and expand business into neighboring communities. The group also formed a 
savings association (SACCO). Before they were trained, members reported difficulties in repaying a loan of TSh 
1000, but now they can afford to borrow more than TSh 100,000 at a higher interest rate. Members have also been 
able to identify new market opportunities for their juice and fresh milk products, and for their processed peanut 
butter and garlic products. Still, lack of capital imposes a constraint on business expansion. The group won a tender 
to supply 390 loaves of bread daily to neighboring secondary schools, but could not meet the terms of the tender due 
to lack of non-charcoal cooking facilities. 
 
Box 5 5: Government Financing of Rural Skills Development 
   
 
The Demand-Driven Skill Development Program (DDSDP) for informal sector training was established under the 
Ministry of Labor and Youth Development in 2001. Since then, it has received about TSh 100 million from the 
government budget every year, drawn partly from HIPC funds. The purpose is to promote self-employment and 
income generation in rural areas. The DDSDP is a countrywide program designed to deliver skills development 
training to improve the employability of adults engaged in productive activities in sectors where the districts have a 
comparative advantage. Under the program, the Rural District Councils identify training needs and collaborate with 
local training institutions  in  overseeing the training.  About 2,670 people have been trained thus  far in courses 
ranging from 14 to 30 days. Sectorwise, about 31 percent of the trainees received training in agriculture and animal 
husbandry, followed by 19 percent in business management, 17 percent in tailoring, and 14 percent in carpentry. 
Other informal sector operators received training in food processing (7 percent) and construction (6 percent). The 
DDSDP delivered training mainly through the FDCs (52 percent), VETA (20 percent), and other public institutions, 
including  SIDO  (17  percent).  The  private  sector  training  institutions  trained  only  about  6  percent  of  the  total 
trainees. Recently, the program has not received the planned government allocations and operations had to be scaled 
back. The DDSDP suffers from several other basic issues: lack of quality screening of the training providers; lack of 
evaluation of the results, lack of tracer study on the value added and performance of graduates in self- employment, 
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6  Conclusions and Policy Options 
 
111.  This study concludes that household enterprises play an increasingly important role 
in‎Tanzania’s‎economy‎as‎a‎major‎livelihood‎source. The HE sector has registered the most 
rapid increase in primary employment, growing faster than wage employment in both agriculture 
and non-agriculture sectors. The continuing uptrend of employment growth in the HE sector 
underscores the potential of HEs for non-farm job creation. Employment in HEs is found to be 
particularly important for primary school leavers, as they lack the necessary skills to secure a 
formal sector job.   
 
112.  Yet despite its capacity to provide employment and income opportunities, HEs face 
several major constraints that inhibit their growth and productivity. In rural areas, HEs cite 
the lack of infrastructure, particularly roads and electricity, as the main barrier that undermines 
their ability to become more productive.  For urban HEs, the lack of fixed location to do business 
is  a  more  binding  constraint.  Without  fixed  business  premises,  they  are  not  eligible  to  be 
formally registered or licensed, hence they operate outside the country‟s legal framework. Given 
the  current  focus  of  LGAs  on  formalization,  the  widespread  official  view  that  HEs  lack 
legitimacy has made these enterprises vulnerable to excessive regulation and its punitive impact, 
in the form of harassment, eviction, and demand for bribes by government or police officials, 
particularly in large urban areas.  
 
113.  In both urban and rural areas, lack of access to credit is cited by majority of HEs as 
a critical constraint that limits their earning capacity.  For them, family and friends are the 
main source of credit for their HE‟s start-up and working capital.  Available sources of more 
formal financing from both the government and private sectors either have limited coverage or 
offer high cost of credit. In addition to the constraints they face, HEs are also vulnerable to risks, 
the most common of which are sudden illness or death in the family, which also limits their 
creditworthiness.  
.   
114.  In spite of its growing importance in creating jobs and sustaining livelihood, the HE 
sector‎is‎not‎included‎in‎the‎government’s‎policy‎and‎institutional framework.  This is partly 
due to the policy dilemma the government faces as to whether to promote HEs on the basis of 
their positive role in the economy, or to thwart them because of their “illegitimacy.” A large 
number of existing programs and projects have been created to provide support to the informal 
sector in  general,  but  do not  address  the specific needs  of HEs in  particular.  With several 
implementing ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) involved, these programs suffer 
from lack of coordination, have overlapping activities and target beneficiaries, and therefore 
have limited impact. 
 
Policy options to improve productivity and incomes of HEs 
 
115.  Recognizing its vital role in income and employment generation is an important first 
step  towards  improving  the  institutional  environment  within  which  HEs  can  operate 
productively.  The need is for an explicit policy and institutional framework in support of HEs 50 
 
and for such framework to be integrated in the broader policy agenda of Tanzania, such as the 
MKUKUTA. In line with this new framework, a focal point within the government should be 
established with the primary tasks of promoting and building support for HEs, including granting 
them legitimacy and supporting services, and coordinating government activities directed to the 
HE sector. 
 
116.  The government should also promote an advocacy group for HEs (e.g., VIBINDO or 
other  such  group),  which  will  provide  them  with  a  political  voice  to  articulate  their  needs; 
facilitate their participation in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policy 
interventions specifically targeted at them; and represent their interest in policymaking at the 
national and local levels. Such advocacy group should also facilitate the flow of information to 
HEs on matters that have a direct influence on their operations (e.g., the new licensing regime 
under  the  BARA  Act)  and  be  able  to  organize  and  mobilize  them  for  appropriate  actions, 
whenever necessary. 
 
117.  The immediate focus should be the creation of a conducive regulatory environment that 
supports HE operations.  This requires a reversal of the current policy bias that weighs heavily 
against HEs.  In the urban areas, LGAs are the key players in efforts to improve the productivity 
of HEs as they administer land and private sector activities.  They could play a major role in 
facilitating the operations of HEs, which would involve focusing on finding solutions to the 
problems of HEs, including legality and workspace.  In doing so, they need to hold dialogues and 
collaborate with HE operators.  They should also recognize the important contributions of HEs in 




middle  class  and  poor  households,  appears  stunted  in  its  growth,  and  this  hurts  the 
productivity of HEs.  It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze the reasons for this and 
prescribe solutions. In other fora, the government has committed itself to addressing this issue 
and developing an action plan. Consultation with target groups would improve the effectiveness 
of the proposed strategy. Meanwhile, the technological breakthrough in reducing the costs of 
providing current account services to small savers through mobile phone banking services such 
as M-Pesa offers exciting possibilities. Financial regulators led by the Bank of Tanzania could 
play  an  active  role  in  promoting  the  entry  of  more  service  providers  to  encourage  greater 
competition, as well as integration of mobile phone services into financial service delivery.   
 
119.  Programs designed to provide access of HEs to financial services are likely to be more 
effective if they have a built-in training component to promote not only financial literacy, but 
also better business operations and management skills.  For this purpose, existing large MFIs 
such as FINCA, PRIDE, and TGT can play major roles, as they are already providing some of 
these programs to their borrowers. The government and donors should support experiments in 
this area, provided that they include effective impact evaluation to identify the best candidates 
for scale-up.  Programs that do not work should be discontinued, and their funds rechanneled to 
those found to be more effective in reaching and improving the productivity of HEs.  51 
 
 
120.  Although many HEs required training, developing programs directed specifically to 
them is not simple owing to the vast number of HEs spread out all over Tanzania. Moreover, the 
opportunity cost HEs face when attending a training program of unknown quality and value 
impedes  their  participation,  especially  once  their  HE  is  up  and  running.  Program  options 
featuring  training  experimentation  and  evaluation  are  appropriate  at  this  stage.  Given  that 
majority of the new entrants to the labor force in the next 5 to 10 years will be primary school 
leavers who are most likely to enter this sector, the government may wish to look at the role 
primary schools could play in meeting the initial needs of HEs (such as financial literacy) as well 
as directing graduates into effective NGO- or public training programs.  Designating a nodal 
training institution tasked with organizing, coordinating, and evaluating training programs for 
HEs might be an effective step towards improving the programs offered. A small share of the 
funds from the “development levy” could be earmarked for this purpose.  Given the need for 
flexibility in training schedules and modules, the NGO sector (as a contractor) may be more 
effective  than  the  public  sector  in  addressing  this  need  as  it  has  shown  this  type  of 
responsiveness thus far in Tanzania. Regardless of the ownership of the service provider, the 
programs need to have a strong demand-driven component and accountability to the funding 
agency through adequate results monitoring and evaluation.  
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Appendix A  
 
Table A1.1: Summary Statistics of Primary Employment by Job Type, 2000/01 and 2006 (percent) 
 








Non-agriculture   
Public wage  2.7   2.6     0.0    3.2 
Private wage  4.9   7.1  2.0  11.2 
Household 
enterprise* 
10.0  15.7  6.0  12.9 
Agriculture   
Wage agriculture  1.0   1.0  0.0  4.7 
Family farming*  81.1  73.5  -8.0  2.1 
Total employment  100.0  100.0  0.0  4.0 
Note: *includes self-employment and family labor   
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2000/01 and 2006 data   
  
 
Table A1.2:  Employment by Job Type, 2006 (percent) 
 
Employment  All urban  Rural  Total 
Non-agriculture       
Public wage  6.2  1.3  2.6 
Private wage  19.9  2.4  7.1 
Household enterprise*  39.5  6.9  15.7 
Agriculture       
Wage agriculture  0.9  1.0  1.0 
4amily farming*  33.5  88.4  73.5 
Total employment  100.00  100.00  100.00 
         Note: *includes self-employment and family labor. 
         Source: Calculations are based on the ILFS 2000/01 and 2006 data 
 
 













Dar  12.4  48.5  67.9  4.0  29.4 
other urban  11.5  29.2  74.2  3.2  59.0 
rural  2.9  5.6  63.5  7.7  96.6 
Total  5.5  14.5  65.9  6.5  82.5 
 
Note: Economic activity here refers to a main or a secondary employment in which a household member is 
engaged.  
 
Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 57 
 













Quintile 1  1.6  2.7  66.1  5.6  97.8 
Quintile 2  3.2  6.2  59.3  7.2  95.4 
Quintile 3  4.1  8.1  69.2  8.4  92.1 
Quintile 4  8.3  17.0  73.1  5.9  79.5 
Quintile 5  11.5  43.3  61.9  5.3  40.9 
Total  5.5  14.5  65.9  6.5  82.5 
 
Note: Economic activity here refers to a main or a secondary employment in which a household member is 
engaged.  
 









Public wage non 
agr. 




Wage agriculture  Family farming  No secondary 
employment 
Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban 
Non agriculture 
Public wage  0.0  0.0  2.5  2.7  8.1  6.9  0.0  0.0  53.3  17.8  36.2  72.7 




0.0  0.0  1.9  1.2  16.5  16.0  0.1  0.0  38.0  12.3  43.5  70.5 
Agriculture 




0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  38.4  37.9  3.1  2.2  4.7  1.6  53.8  58.3 
Total 
employment 
0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1  35.6  22.1  2.7  0.8  8.7  8.3  52.7  67.7 
 
Note:  *Includes self-employment and family labor. Row percentage calculated for females and males separately. 
 
Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
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Public wage non 
agri. 





Wage agriculture  Family farming  No secondary 
employment 
Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males 
Non agriculture 
Public wage  0.0  0.0  2.3  2.7  12.9  4.6  0.0  0.0  24.6  33.5  60.3  59.2 




0.0  0.0  0.6  2.4  20.8  10.5  0.0  0.1  17.7  23.9  60.9  63.2 
Agriculture 
Wage  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  26.8  9.6  1.2  2.4  20.7  23.0  51.3  65.0 
Family 
farming
*  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  48.0  26.8  1.5  4.7  2.0  7.1  48.4  61.4 
Total 
employment 
0.0  0.0  0.2  0.8  41.5  21.6  1.2  3.3  5.5  12.0  51.7  62.3 
 
Note:  *Includes self-employment and family labor. Row percentage calculated for females and males separately. 
 
Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
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Table A1.7: Socio-demographic Profile of HE Operators (percent) 
 
  2000/01      2006 
Rural  Secondary 
Urban 
Dar-es-
Salaam  Total  Rural  Secondary 
Urban 
Dar-es-
Salaam  Total 
                 
Age cohorts                 
15-24  22.0  21.3  18.8  21.4  19.8  17.8  14.1  18.4 
25-34  30.6  32.4  35.5  31.8  31.8  39.1  38.1  34.5 
35-44  24.8  23.0  25.1  24.3  23.4  23.4  24.3  23.5 
45-54  13.0  15.5  12.8  13.7  13.2  12.1  13.3  13.0 
55-64  5.9  6.1  5.3  5.9  6.8  4.8  6.4  6.2 
65+  3.7  1.8  2.6  3.0  5.1  3.0  3.7  4.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                 
Gender                  
Male  55.1  43.9  46.3  50.7  54.1  46.7  54.5  52.3 
Female  44.9  56.1  53.7  49.3  45.9  53.3  45.5  47.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                 
Level of schooling                 
No education  22.1  11.6  8.6  17.3  24.0  10.2  11.0  18.6 
Inc. Primary  19.5  17.5  8.8  17.6  16.5  11.2  10.3  14.2 
Comp. Primary  56.0  62.9  73.2  60.2  56.2  68.9  66.9  61.0 
Incomp. Ord. Sec  0.5  2.8  0.6  1.2  1.1  2.7  2.1  1.6 
Comp Ord Sec  1.8  4.4  8.1  3.3  2.0  6.5  8.0  4.0 
Some/Comp Adv Sec / univ.   0.1  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.5  1.7  0.5 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
 
               
Type of training                 
None  81.8  81.7  77.6  81.3  87.7  80.5  70.1  83.2 
On the job  3.0  2.7  4.4  3.1  4.1  4.4  6.3  4.5 
Informal, vocational, other  15.2  15.5  18.0  15.7  8.1  15.2  23.6  12.2 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
                 
Migration status                 
Since birth  81.8  54.7  46.8  69.3  77.4  51.4  36.2  64.7 
Less than 5 years  3.5  6.5  4.0  4.5  4.3  12.9  14.1  7.9 
More than 5 years  14.7  38.7  49.2  26.2  18.3  35.6  49.7  27.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Note: All estimates are only for age groups 15 and above. The “informal, vocational, and other” category of training includes  informal 
apprenticeships, vocational certificates, college certificates, and diplomas and advanced diplomas from universities. 
 
Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2000/01 and ILFS 2006 data. The coding of the spatial locations is not consistent in both surveys, so 
comparisons between the two surveys by area are biased and should be regarded with care. 
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Table A1 8: Socio-demographic Profile of the Labor Force (15+), 2006 (percent) 
 
  Rural  Secondary Urban  Dar-es-Salaam  Total 
         
Age cohorts         
15-24  27.9  24.8  21.8  26.8 
25-34  26.0  31.3  33.7  27.6 
35-44  18.4  20.3  21.6  19.0 
45-54  12.6  12.2  13.6  12.6 
55-64  7.9  6.3  6.4  7.5 
65+  7.3  5.1  2.9  6.5 
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Gender          
Male  48.1  48.5  56.5  48.9 
Female  51.9  51.5  43.5  51.1 
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Education         
No education  30.5  12.5  7.6  25.5 
Incomplete primary  16.9  12.6  8.0  15.4 
Completed primary  49.0  60.2  61.5  51.9 
Incomplete ordinary secondary  1.4  3.7  2.8  1.9 
Completed ordinary secondary  2.0  9.1  13.9  4.2 
Advanced secondary / university  0.3  1.8  6.2  1.1 
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Type of training         
None  93.0  79.4  62.7  88.1 
On job training  2.2  4.4  8.0  3.1 
Other training  4.8  16.2  29.3  8.9 
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Period of residence         
Since birth  79.4  56.2  34.7  71.6 
Less than 5 years  3.4  12.3  17.8  6.2 
More than 5 years  17.2  31.5  47.5  22.3 
Total  100  100  100  100 
 
Note:  All estimates are for age groups 15 and above. The „informal, vocational, other‟ category of training 
includes  informal apprenticeships, vocational certificates, college certificates, diplomas and advanced diplomas, 
including from university. 
 
  Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data. 
 
 
Table A1.9: Average Education, by Employment Type and Age Group, 2006 (years) 
 
  15 - 19  20 - 30  31 - 45  +45  All 
Public wage non-agriculture  6.0  10.4  10.5  9.7  10.1 
Private wage non-agriculture  6.5  7.6  7.9  7.4  7.5 
HE non-agriculture  6.0  5.8  5.6  2.9  4.8 
Wage agriculture  4.1  5.1  5.0  2.9  4.5 
Family farming  5.7  5.3  5.2  2.8  4.2 
Total  5.9  5.8  5.7  3.3  4.6 
 
Note: Employment type refers to primary employment only. 
 
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data.   61 
 
Table A1.10: Occupation Distribution of HE Operators, 2006 (percent) 
 





         
Professional / technical / clerical  1.4  2.0  3.9  1.9 
Service, shop sales  52.6  59.3  56.2  54.8 
Skilled agr. and fishery  4.4  1.0  1.5  3.1 
Crafts and related work  25.1  22.7  22.8  24.1 
Plant, machine operation  4.9  2.2  1.1  3.7 
Elementary occupation  11.5  12.8  14.6  12.3 
Total  100  100  100  100 
 
 Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
 
Table A1.11: Variables Mean by Gender, 2006       
        
Variable  males  females 
Age  36.0  35.3 
Education = None  0.11  0.20 
Education = Incomplete Primary  0.14  0.12 
Education = Completed Primary  0.66  0.61 
Education = Incomplete Secondary  0.02  0.02 
Education = Completed  Ordinary Secondary  0.06  0.04 
Education = Some or completed Adv. Secondary and Tertiary  0.01  0.00 
Recent migrant  0.09  0.10 
Market within 30 min  0.64  0.68 
# Months business operates in last 12 months  9.30  8.92 
Training = No training  0.77  0.88 
Training = On job/informal apprenticeship  0.16  0.08 
Training =  Other(vocational/college/diploma/other)  0.07  0.03 
Sector=Manufacturing/Energy  0.16  0.21 
Sector=Mining/Construction  0.10  0.01 
Sector=Wholesale/retail trade/repair  0.60  0.53 
Sector=Hotels and restaurants  0.05  0.21 
Sector=Transport/finance/real estate  0.05  0.00 
Sector=Public, social, personal services  0.05  0.03 
Training*manufacturing  0.07  0.05 
Training*Construction, mining  0.03  0.00 
Training*wholesale, retail trade  0.10  0.04 
Training*Hotels / restaurants  0.01  0.02 
Training* Transport, storage, real estate  0.01  0.00 
Training*Public, social, personal services  0.01  0.01 
Rural  0.51  0.47 
Dar  0.18  0.15 
Other urban  0.32  0.39 
 
                   Source:  Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
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Table A1.12:  Household/Community Characteristics by Employment Status, 2005 
   




Test for difference 
Income and its composition 
       
Per capita income  288.73  256.83  317 .85  ** 
(Tshs)         
Share from crop 
production (%) 
40.71  54.42   30.17  *** 
Share from livestock (%)  15.51  18.52  11 09  *** 
Share from non-farm self-
employment (%) 
21.12  4.62  35.90  *** 
Share from wage (%)  12.30  9.74  14.58  *** 
Share from transfer (%)  10 35  12.70         8.26   
Household characteristics         
Household size  4.08  4 71  5.22  *** 
Self-employment of 
head's parents (%) 
12.1-1  8.73  15.26    
Head's years of 
education 
6.55  I.19  7.62  *** 
Head's age  43.11  45.05  41 33  *** 
Female headed (%)  16.15  21.64  11.14  *** 
Maximum years of 
education 
7.63  6.34  8.80  *** 
Total household assets  2,502.61  1,706.87  3,229 05  *** 
(1,000  Tshs)         
Total land area (acre)  4.67  4.6 I  4.72  *** 
Community characteristics         
Share with access to 
electricity (%,) 
38.24  32.33  43.63   
Share with public transport to 
market (%) 
15.04  14.24  I5.77  * 
Share with bank (%)  24.33  22.13  26.35   
Mud road only (%)  52.43  54.75  50.31  ** 
Distance to city (km)  18,54  10.84  17.36  *** 
Distance to market (km)  7.16  7.00  6.48  *** 
Distance to bank (km)  45.33  47.07  42.91   
Number of observations  1,503  809   784   
 
Note: The last column reports test results for the mean differences between non-enterprise households (column 2) 
and enterprise households (column 3). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Source: Jin and Deininger (2008:344) using computation from NBS and World Bank 2005 RIC Survey.  
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Table A1.13:  Access to Banks, by Location, 2009  
 
























Not  bank saver  432  79.3  827  90.7  1259  86.5 
Total   544  100  912  100  1456  100 
 
Barriers to having bank savings 
   
 
       
 
Economic barrier  391  92.2  767  92.4  1158  92.3 
Knowledge barrier 




















Cost barrier  68  16.0  148  17.8  249  19.8 















Other barriers  71  16.7  16  1.9  193  15.4 
Total   424    830    1254   
 
Source: Calculations based on the FinScope Survey 2009 data.  
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Table A1.14:  Access to Savings, by Location, 2009 
1.8.1   
Urban 
HEs 
%  Rural 
HEs 
%   All 
HEs 
% 
Formal Saving             





































           
Savings account at a SACCO  18  3.2  38  4.2  56  3.8 
Savings at an MFI (e.g., PRIDE)  25  4.7  5  0.5  31  2.1 
Employer Savings Scheme 















           
Savings with a ROSCA  137  25.2  102  11.2  239  16.4 
Savings with a clan / family group 
Savings with a welfare group 



















Savings with an ASCA 
Savings with businessman for safekeeping 




















Excluded; Totally unserved 
           
Savings in nonmonetary items(jewelry, etc) 













Total  544    912    1456   
 
 Note: Multiple answers possible 
  
Source: Calculations based on the FinScope Survey 2009 data.  
 
 
Table A1.15: Distribution of Credit Sources, by Gender, 2006 (percent) 
1.8.2   
Credit sources, by gender 
  Male  Female  Total 
       
Relative or friend  53.1  45.1  48.2 
Rotating saving & credit group (UPATU)  7.5  9.3  8.6 
Saving and credit co-operative (SACCO)  11.5  15.7  14.1 
Business association, NGO, donor project  10.9  16.9  14.6 
Bank or financial institution  7.5  4.3  5.6 
Other sources  9.5  8.7  9.0 
Total  100  100  100 
  
Source: Calculations based on the ILFS 2006 data 
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Table A1.16:  Access to Credit, by Area, 2009 
 
  Urban HEs  % 























Not applied for a loan       453  83.2  807  88.5  1260  86.5 
Total  544    912    1456   
 
Reasons for not applying 
     
 
   
 
 
Fear of not having money to repay loan  157  34.7   298  36.9  455  36.1 
Have never needed it       152  33.5  217  26.9  369  36.1 
Tough loan conditions  113  24.9  152  18.8  265  21.0 
Don‟t have enough money  93  20.5  126  15.6  219  17.4 
Don‟t know where to get a loan  73  16.1  139  17.2  212  16.8 
Don‟t believe in paying interest  43  9.4  80  9.9  122  9.7 
No  place nearby to get a loan  4  0.9  111  13.8  108  9.1 
Too much charge for the loan  50  11.1  58  7.2  115  8.6 
Don‟t have a collateral  31  6.9  42  5.3  74  5.8 
Don‟t have a guarantor / referee  27  6.0  35  4.3  62  4.9 
Don‟t have identification/documentation  2  0.4  27  3.3  29  2.3 
Too young to qualify  7  1.4  13  1.6  20  1.6 
Spouse / partner won‟t allow it  3  0.6  5  0.7  8  0.7 
Others  2  0.5  1  0.1  3  0.2 
Total  453    807    1260   
 
 Note: Multiple answers possible  
  
Source: Calculations based on the FinScope Survey 2009 data.  
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Table A1.17: Risks HEs Face, by Area, 2009  
 
1.   
Risks 








In-patient  478  87.9  895  98.2  1373  94.3 
Death of a family member  234  43.0  404  44.7  642  44.1 
Accident  179  32.9  332  36.5  511  35.1 
Drought / famine  138  25.3  345  37.9  483  33.2 
Theft at household / property   176  32.4  266  29.2  443  30.1 
Death of the breadwinner in the household  126  23.2  162  17.8  289  19.8 
Outpatient  91  16.7  190  20.8  281  19.3 
Destruction of household/property due to floods  60  11.0  134  14.7  194  13.3 
Destruction of home/household items due to fire 
Secondary school fees 
Weddings 
Birth of a child 
Failure of business/bankruptcy 
Education expenses excldg. sec. school fees 
Rise in food prices 
Theft or destruction of agri. crop/livestock 
Death of livestock (due to famine, diseases) 
Breadwinner in household loses job 
Disability of household member 
Separation/divorce 
Nonpayment fr. creditors/ who owe money 
Unforeseen major surgery 
Rent increase 






















































































































Total number of respondents  544    912    1456   
 
Note: Multiple answers possible             
 
Source: Calculations based on the FinScope Survey 2009 data.  
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Table A1.18: Coping Strategies of HEs, by Location, 2009  
 
2.   




Borrow money from family/friend  311  57.2  425  46.7  736  50.6 
Use up savings  226  41.7  432  47.4  658  45.3 
Sell assets/  133  24.5  278  30.5  411  28.3 
Sell agricultural crop/livestock  63  11.5  339  37.2  402  27.6 
Wait/ask for donation  118  21.7  225  24.7  342  23.6 
Cut down on household expenses  97  17.8  149  16.3  246  16.9 
Borrow from SACCOS, moneylender  52  9.5  76  8.3  128  8.8 
Take out savings with bank  62  11.5  50  5.5  112  7.7 
Ask community (neighbors, church, mosque)  31  5.4  30  3.3  60  4.2 
Postpone plans to pay for something else  21  3.8  21  2.3  42  2.9 
Apply for government grant  3  0.5  19  2.9  21  1.5 
Borrow money from employer  9  1.6  7  0.8  16  1.1 
Borrow money from bank  5  0.8  11  1.2  0.8  1.1 
Take out savings w/ other financial provider  7  1.3  4  0.5  12  0.8 
There’s nothing you can do  9  1.6  9  1.0  18  1.2 
Claim insurance  1  0.1  1  0.1  1  0.1 
Cash in other financial instruments (shares)  0  0.0  2  0.1  1  0.1 
Others  5  0.9  5  0.6  10  0.7 
Don’t know  8  1.4  13  1.4  21  1.4 
             
Total number of respondents  544    910    1454   
Source: Calculations based on the FinScope Survey 2009 data.  
   68 
 
Table A1.19: Summary of Major Changes in the Business Licensing Regime 
 
Issue  Old Regime  New (BARA) Regime  Comment 
Main law (Act) 
 
Business Licensing Act No. 25 of 1972  Business Activity Registration (BARA) Act 
of 2009, already approved by the cabinet 




Business license, essentially meant to 
legitimize the business activity  
Business activity registration certificate, 
meant to legitimize the operator of the 
business. 
 
Definition of  a 
business 
“Business” means any form of trade, 
commerce, craftsmanship or specified 
profession carries on for profit or gain and 
to which the provisions of the Act apply. 
Same as in the old Act  1) Is the Machinga trade a business? 
Para 5 of the old Act states, “This Act 
shall apply to all businesses other 
than…business of an itinerant trader 
duly licensed… under the Itinerant 
Traders Ordinance…”   
 
2) The issue of multiple locations of 
enterprises is a challenge for the system. 
Classes/categorie
s of licenses 
Two classes of licenses: class „A‟ national 
level business administered by the MITM; 
and class „B‟ administered by the LGA 
officials. It is the class “B” types that are 
more problematic and segmented 
A single regime issuing one certificate (not 
a license), regardless of size of enterprise, 
except where additional licensing is 
required in regulated activities (e.g., 
telecommunications, transportation, energy, 
etc.) 
 
Issuing authority  MITM for class “A” and LGA for class 
“B”. In LGA, the function was performed 
by the District Trade Officer  
LGA Registrar (new position in each LGA 
under the BARA law) currently appointed, 
and are undertaking training for this role. 
Does Registrar work for BRELA? What 
will District Trade Officers do?  Will 
they seek new rents or will they play a 
supportive role?  
Coverage of HEs  Class B covered only HEs with a business 
premise (fixed location). Before 2004 
reforms, itinerant trade licenses were issued 
by LGAs to Machingas in the form of a 
Nguvukazi license. 
Cover only HEs with a fixed premise.   
Implementing 
Agency 
MITM or LGA  BRELA   
Validity period  Permanent (except for liquor-/bar-related 
business, which needs to be renewed every 
6 months).  
Permanent (for a specific location)  If business moves, whole registration 
procedure starts over.  
Market Fees 
(cess) 
Set at local level by market authority  Set at local level by market authority   
Taxes  TRA regulations: Business tax paid per 
month (due 3 months in advance) based on 
turnover. Minimum amount = TSh 35,000 
per month (even for loss-making 
enterprise).  
 
Certificate of advance payment required for 
business activity registration certificate. 
 
 (Only licensed businesses subject to tax; 
Machnigas not subject to tax.) 
TRA regulations: Business tax paid per 
month (due 3 months in advance) based on 
turnover. Minimum amount = TSh 35,000 
per month (even for loss-making 
enterprise).  
 





Removing the advance tax payment 
helps HEs.  
 
But, tax may still be regressive.  Most 
SMEs and especially HEs, do not keep 
books of accounts, as a result, they have 
little room to justify their tax liability.  
Effective date   Ends once BARA is effective.  According to BRELA, may not take effect 
until after the new Cabinet is formed 
following the October 31 elections. 
However, BRELA has completed training 
in the 24 LGAs, which have also been 
provided with computers for this purpose. 
Awareness and compliance by 
enterprises. Who is informing HEs of 
changes and their requirements?  
LGA regulatory 
mandate  
Frequent inspections by land, health, and 
trade officers were allowed.  Proved to be 
quite costly 
Forbids inspection by health, land, and 
trade officers UNLESS deemed necessary 
by the nature of activity (as specified in the 
law).  
Corruption and transaction costs reduced 
 – Are HEs informed? 
- Who protects the Machingas and other 
HEs w/o fixed location from LGA 
harassment?  
Source: Compilation based on the Mushi (2008) and field surveys, along with interviews with BRELA officials.  69 
Table A1.20:  Sampled List of Programs and Projects on the Informal Sector 
 
S/No  Name/Title  Type/ 





Institution  Target Beneficiaries  Financing Sources  Expected Outcomes  Constraints Risks 
1  Demand- driven 
Training Program 




Youth in the  informal 
sector 
GOT  Employment 
creation 
-Political pressure 
-LGA Not responsive 
-Youth not responsive 
2  Youth Exchange 
Program 
Program  Stimulate 
entrepreneurship 
Exposure  Visit to successful 
areas 
-MLEYD 
-Jua Kali exhibition 
Entrepreneurs  GOT  Enhanced 
performance in 
business 
-Insufficient capital for 
execution 
3  Life Skills Program  Program  Self realization  Lack of life skills  Training Program  MLEYD  Young mothers  GOT  Youth with life skills 
for self- employment 
Low coverage 
4  Out-of- school Youth 
Program 





Training programs  MLEYD 
UNICEF 
Out-of-school youth  UNICEF  Trained youth for 
self-employment 
Low coverage 
5  Training of 
Entrepreneurship 
Program 






Training program  MLEYD  Business dealers in the 
informal sector 





6  Rural Financial Services 
Program 
Program, 2001-2009  Provide financial 
services in rural 
areas 
Lack of financial 







Rural communities and 










7  Small Entrepreneurs 





Improve access of  





for small business 




Household in the 
program areas 
GOT  Credit facilities to 
households 
Low coverage 
8  Youth Development 
Fund (YDF) 
Development fund  Empowerment of 
youth 
Unemployment  Capital acquisition  -YOUTH 
-MLEYD 



















-Ministry of Trade 
Dealers in the informal 
sector 





-Low level of training 
10  Women Development 
Fund (WDF) 











Gender and Children 




-Low skills in business 
11  Presidential Trust Fund 
(PTF) 
Development fund  Empower 
Tanzanians to self-
employ themselves 
Lack of credit  Development Fund  President‟s Office  Households  GOT  Enhanced access to 
capital by HEs 
-Inability to 
accommodate very high 
demand 
12  National Income 
Generating Program 
(NIGP)  
Development fund  Empowerment of the 














-Lack of business skills 
13  Tanzania Social Action 
Fund (TASAF) 














Social development  Low coverage 


















-Lack of business skills 











Villagers VICOBA  Households  NGOs  Increased HE‟s 
access to finance 
-Low awareness 
-Low business skills 
16  Promotion of Rural 
Initiatives and 
Microfinance  Provide capital to 
small entrepreneurs 
Lack of small 
business capital 
Microfinance loans  -Household groups 
-NGOs 
Households  PRIDE (NGO)  Increased access to 
business finance 
-Low business skills 
-High interest rates 70 
 
S/No  Name/Title  Type/ 









- Default risk 
17  Business and Property 
Formalization Program 
(MKURABITA) 
















Incentives to formalize 
might not work 
18  Local Government 
Support Project (LGSP) 













Unwillingness of the 
Central Government to 
decentralize-Low 
capacity of LGAs 
19  Strategic Plan for the 
Implementation of Land 
Laws Program (SPILL) 
Program,2005-2014  Operationalize the 
land laws 
Lack of  




safeguard land rights 

















Program,2004-2009  Reduce 
administrative 
barriers to doing 
business 
Business growth  Faster business 
Regulations 







21  Cooperative Reform and 
Modernization Program 
(CRMP) 



















22  Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies 





Savings and credits  -Households 
-SACCOS 
-LGAs 








23  Youth Economic Groups  Program  -Joint effort in 
economic activities 
-Enhance production 





-Low capital base 
-Low skills 
24  VETA Training on 
Business Skills 





Training   VETA  Small scale businesses   GTZ  Trained small-scale 
businesses and 
increased 
productivity of their 
businesses   
Involves a fee 
considered small, but 
may be a disincentive to 
many. 
Selective in terms of 
size and location; may 
not reach many needy 
households   
25  Training on Business 
Skills 





Training   Private institutions, 
NGOs, UMATI 
Small-scale business  GTZ  Trained small-scale 
businesses and 
increased 
productivity of their 
businesses   






A Story of Success in Business 
Mr. Christopher Kimoso is 41 years old, married, and has a family of five, including himself. He completed class 
seven in primary school.  He used to run a business buying and selling crops in Babati in the Manyara region. From 
there, he moved to Arusha to join his wife, who was then on contract work with a company providing services to the 
Tanzania Breweries Limited. Because of his limited capital, he could not continue with his trading business, but 
instead started selling used shoes on the streets (a Machinga) in Arusha.  He had since been in this business for the 
last five years, from which he had earned a fairly good income.  Having invested a small capital of TSh 350,000, he 
earned about the same from selling used shoes as from buying and selling crops in Manyara. 
 
Mr. Kimoso‟s current business has contributed to the wellbeing of his family.  The profit he earned had made it 
possible for him to pay for his children‟s secondary education. He was also able to buy a plot of land worth TSh 
1,800,000 three years ago, and since then had been purchasing construction materials to build his house. 
 
Mr. Kimoso believed his success in business was due to two factors: the cumulative experience he had gained over 
the last five years in doing the same business and his good management of income from the business (what he called 
“balancing of income,” that is, using a part of it for personal consumption, but also reinvesting a large part in his 
business. The main challenge facing him was a lack of a proper place (banda or a booth) in which to operate.  
 
Mr. Kimoso saw opportunities to grow his business by participating in a loan program with PRIDE Tanzania.  He 
had borrowed TSh 200,000 from the program, which he expected to repay in full by June, 2010.  He intended to 
apply for another TSh 400,000 loan to be able to rent a banda in town to expand his business. However, Mr. Kimoso 
said he would stop borrowing money from PRIDE Tanzania when his business become more established due to the 
high interest charges on its loans. 
 
In-depth Interview with Hafsa Hassan (a youth, FGD, Matwara): 
A Story of Success in Business 
The 25-year old Hafsa Hassan from Matwara completed her secondary education in Songea, where she relocated in 
1997 after getting married.  In 1999, she returned to Matwara to give birth to a child after divorcing her abusive 
husband.  In 2000, from her salary as an elections clerk in 2000, she managed to save TSh 150,000, which she used 
to start a business buying and selling cashew nuts.  As a petty trader, she could join the Matwara Small 
Entrepreneurship Development Association (MSEDA), which she did in 2003.  From MSEDA, she was able to get a 
TSh 500,000 loan to expand her trading business from 20 kg to more than 200kg of cashew nuts.  Also through 
MSEDA, she availed of various training opportunities, including study tours, with SIDO, ILO, and other NGOs. 
Commenting on the reasons for her success in business, she remarked: 
 
“Unahitaji kuwa mbunifu na mtafutaji wa misaada kama unataka kufanikiwa kama mjasiriamali mdogo. Nilianza 
kidogo kidogo, lakini nilihakikisha natafuta taarifa muhimu kuhusu maendelea ya biashara kokote nilikosikia. 
Nilipoingia MSEDA ikawa ndiyo kama Mungu kanifungulia….nilikutana na wenzangu, tukabadilishana mawazo na 
uzoefu. Tulipata mafunzo kutoka sehemu mbalimbali. Kwa sasa naweza kusema mimi ni kati ya kinamama ambao 
ukija miaka michache ijayo utakuta nina kampuni  yangu ya kubangua na kuuza korosho.” This means, “You need 
to be creative and look for where you can get assistance if you want to succeed as a small entrepreneur. I started 
with a small capital, but I was constantly looking for important information and opportunities that could help me 
succeed. When I joined MSEDA, it was like God opening the door for me. I met several entrepreneurs and we 
exchanged ideas and also got training from several sources. I can go so far as to say that I am one of few women 
who, when you come back here a few years from now, will be owning a factory, and in my case, my own cashew 
nut processing factory.” 
 
Hafsa is currently trading on more than 250 kilograms of cashew nuts and has a working capital of more than TSh 
1.5 million. She attributes her success to training, access to loans, and support by institutions, such as SIDO and 
ILO.   
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In-depth Interview with Amina L. Abdalah (Female participant, FGD, Mtwara):  
A Story of Failure in Business 
Amina is married, and a mother in a family of seven people.  She completed class seven of primary school, and by 
then was already involved in making and selling vitumbua (cookies).  She had been doing this business for six years. 
None of the other household members was directly involved in her business.  
 
Amina started to engage in business as a food vendor (mama lishe) in 1993 after her husband was retrenched 
(kupunguzwa kazi) from his job of many years at the Agriculture Department in Mtwara Municipality. She was 
given an initial capital of TSh 5,000 by her husband to start food-vending. She then had a temporary banda 
constructed around a cashew nut processing industry in a place called Olam. However, business at Olam was 
seasonal and was good only during cashew nut harvesting season between October and January. Furthermore, after 
every harvest season, her banda invariably would be demolished by unknown individuals who would sell whatever 
they could get from it, causing her heavy losses. She then decided to move her business to another place at the 
harbor where she, along with two other women,  rented a place to sell food. In the first few weeks, she could sell all 
the food she had prepared and business was good. As the days went on, however, things changed for the worse.  On 
many occasions, she could not sell enough and had to carry home a large portion of what she had cooked for her 
family and give some away to the needy for free. She was quoted as saying: “Niliona biashara yenyewe hainilipi. 
Tofauti na siku za mwanzo, chakula kilikuwa kinabaki narudisha nyumbani ama nagawia majirani,” which means, 
“The business was not paying! Unlike in the early days, a big chunk of the cooked food remained unsold and I had 
to take it home or give it to neighbors.”   
 
Today, Amina conducts her vitumbua-making business from home.  Her new business is doing better than her 
previous one, and she need not have to walk long distances to and from the harbor as before.  It has also allowed her 
to do other domestic work at home. 
 
In-depth Interview with Mr. Aruna Omari (Male participant, FGD, Mwanza) 
A Story of Failure in Business 
Mr. Aruna Omari, 48 years old, did not complete his primary education.  He used to run a few business, but later 
quit.  He had since been involved in other activities, including farming, brick-making, and painting houses and 
buildings. Mr. Aruna Omari‟s long business history started with buying rice from farmers in Misungwi district and 
selling it in the rice mills in Mwanza town. He stayed in this business until 1986 when, having saved enough capital, 
he opened up his own place to sell rice in Mwanza town. This new highly profitable business led him to go into 
another business, a butchery, in the same town.  His start-up capital of TSh 170,000 was enough to buy him two big 
bulls.  It proved to be a lucrative business in its initial years of operation. From his earnings, he was able to build a 
house and buy a car. 
 
The year 1998, however, saw the beginning of the downturn of his butchery business. Unable to sell enough, he 
said: “Nilikuwa nikichinja nyama haishi. Kwa mfano, nilikuwa nikichinja ng‟ombe wa shilingi laki moja, siku ya 
kwanza ninauza shiling elfu sabini. Nyama ikilala inaharibika na unalazimika kushusha bei. Mtaji ukakata,” which 
literary means, “I could not sell all the meat. For example, when I slaughtered a cow worth TSh 100,000, I could sell 
about Tsh 70,000 worth on the first day. When meat remains unsold, one has to sell at a lower price the following 
day. I was losing my capital.” 
 
With depleted capital, Mr. Omari began to depend on the kindness of his suppliers to agree on a business 
arrangement commonly known as mali kauli, by which he was supplied a cow on the condition that he would pay 
for it after slaughtering and selling the meat.  Such arrangement gave him very limited room to negotiate. For 
instance, a cow which he could buy for TSh 100,000 if he paid in cash was sold to him at about TSh107,000. Thus, 
his earnings continued to decline. 
 
By 1999, the debt Mr. Omari owed his suppliers reached a total of TSh 1,600,000.  To clear off a part of it, he sold 
his car for TSh 800,000. He also hired out the premises of his butchery to be able to earn some income to support his 
family. Because he could not pay the full amount of what he owed, his suppliers had to write his debt off. 